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Passive communications satellites were instrumental in the evolution of today's
satellite communications networks. However, since the successful deployment of the first
geostationary satellite, research and development into passive communications satellites has
almost come to a halt. In addition to examining the characteristics of the historic passive
satellites, this thesis will evaluate the capabilities of a new design approach for a passive
system. The passive backscatter array, which was initially proposed by Joseph Yater, was
intended to provide an effective communications satellite with a large radar cross section.
Primary emphasis is placed upon this system's survivability within a nuclear stressed
environment. The effects of a nuclear burst upon the propagation of an electromagnetic
signal are evaluated so as to assess the system's survivability. Both the advantages and
disadvantages of a passive communications satellite are evaluated to determine its suitability
for use within the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network. The concept
of developing a passive satellite system that would use the HF spectrum is also explored.
It was found that such a system would be untenable due to the large size of the satellite
reflector and excessive signal absorption in a nuclear environment. Passive satellites which
use the SHF band may prove to be effective for the broadcast of strategic messages
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The United States' satellite communication program started in the 1960's with the
introduction of the Echo I and II passive satellites. Work on passive satellites continued
through 1966 with the introduction of the OVI-8 wire grid sphere. In 1969 the Goodyear
Aerospace Corporation completed their study of a passive communications satellite which
would be in the shape of a saddle reflector. However, since the successful deployment of
the first active geostationary Syncom satellite in 1963 the concept of using passive satellites
has fallen into disfavor. Almost instantly active satellites became the panacea for all
communication problems.
Recently, doubt has been cast upon the continued availability of active satellites in a
hostile environment. These satellites can be easily jammed and are very susceptible to
HEMP damage in a post nuclear environment. With this in mind there has been renewed
interest in the use of passive satellites. As a result of this interest the Rand Corporation has
been commissioned by DARPA to develop a proposal for a PACSAT (Passive
Communication Satellite) system. Once again a new idea has its roots firmly planted in the
past.
Some of the supposed advantages of a passive satellite system are: increased reliability
due to the lack of electronic and moving parts, jamming resistance due to frequency agility
over a large transmission bandwidth, lower costs, imperviousness to HEMP, and lower
susceptiblity to active countermeasures. Additionally, passive satellites would weigh
considerably less than their active counterparts. This may translate to a savings in launch
delivery cost while at the same time broadening the set of potential launch vehicles that may
be used to place the satellites into orbit. This is particularly important in light of the delay
that NASA has experienced with their launch schedule.
B. OBJECTIVES
The primary emphasis will be to determine if a passive communications satellite
system may be used effectively in a hostile environment. Also, depending upon the
advantages and disadvantages of such a system, what type of mission would it be best
suited for, strategic or tactical? In determining mission suitability the proposed system will
be evaluated with respect to communications availability, reliability, survivability,
interoperability, and graceful degradation.
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In keeping with the concept of attaining survivable and effective communications in a
hostile environment, increased emphasis has been placed upon improving the capabilities of
existing HF communications, to wit the High Frequency Anti Jam (HF-AJ) program and
improved HF environmental prediction models. One of the concepts to be examined in this
thesis is that of using the HF spectrum in conjunction with passive satellites. By using
direct HF line of sight to a satellite the more traditional means of skywave propagation is
circumvented.
Of particular concern will be the system's ability to maintain an operational
communications link in a post nuclear environment. Both the SHF and HF spectrum will
be considered in determining the degree of degradation inherent to a passive
communications satellite relay within a nuclear stressed environment.
Cost considerations are always crucial to the development and success of any new
communications system. While specific costs for the development and deployment of a
passive communications array will not be examined, key factors affecting those costs will
be reviewed. To what degree are there common or unique determinants of costs for both a
passive and active communications satellite?
Finally, with respect to transmission characteristics, what type of data rates may be
sustained by a passive system and what factors affect the data rates and signal to noise ratio
of such a system?
C. THESIS OUTLINE
The following chapter will provide the reader with a summary of the United States'
communications satellite development program. Starting in the early 1960's with the
development and deployment of the Echo series of passive satellites and progressing to the
current system of active geosynchronous satellites. That chapter will describe in some detail
the communication performance characteristics that were attained with the Echo-II satellite
during an experiment conducted between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The
closing sections of Chapter II will describe the Passive Communications Satellite Array
(PACSAT) that is being studied by the Rand Corporation.
Chapter IU deals with the effects of a high altitude nuclear burst upon the ionosphere.
It examines the degree of ionospheric deterioration due to the release of both prompt and
delayed radiation. Of primary interest is the debilitating effects that a nuclear burst has
upon the communications spectrum. Both the HF and SHF spectrum are examined to
determine their susceptibility to increases in the amount of atmospheric noise, refraction
and absorption resulting from a nuclear blast. A series of graphs are presented to display
the effects upon electromagnetic absorption as a function of burst height, yield, and time.
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A detailed description of the design and performance characteristics of the PACSAT
array is presented in Chapter IV. Both the operating and structural characteristics of the
array are examined as well as its orbital placement and required constellation size. The
received signal is characterized by its minimum required signal to noise ratio in order to
attain the desired probability of error. An example of a "typical" communications link is
described with its associated path calculations.
Chapter V presents an analysis of the passive communications satellite with respect to
cost and operating efficiency. It describes the determinants of cost for both the active and
passive system. A cost model is presented which delineates the determinants of total cost
for a passive communications satellite network. The cost efficiency model of an active
satellite network is also presented as a means of identifying the measures of capacity that
may be important to a passive satellite communications network.
The remaining sections of Chapter V deal with an analysis of the potential survivability
of a passive satellite in a hostile environment. Such an environment would be typified by
active jamming, anti-satellite weapons, and the possibility of signal propagation being
deteriorated by a nuclear burst. Finally, the chapter closes with an evaluation of the passive
satellite's suitability for a strategic role, specifically as a part of the Minimum Essential
Emergency Communications Network. The final chapter of the thesis presents the author's
conclusions and findings.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Any use of the HF spectrum in conjunction with a passive communications satellite
would be ineffective due to the satellite's size requirements and excessive absorption loss in
a nuclear environment. The attenuation caused by suspended particulate matter after a
nuclear burst would result in some deterioration of a SHF signal on a passive satellite link.
Due to the limited field of view of any one satellite the role of the passive satellite
system would be restricted in scope. Interoperability between services would be restricted
due to the limited coverage area. However, the large number of satellites required in any
passive communications system would add significantly to the redundancy, survivability,
and graceful degradation of the entire network.
Current design specifications for a passive satellite array result in serious deficiencies
in orbital stability. The orbital instability of the PACSAT array may result in substantial
signal degradation. However, passive satellites have in the past proven themselves to be
capable of maintaining an effective communications link. The success of any future
passive satellite system would depend upon solving the problem of orbital instability.
II. SATELLITE BACKGROUND
In 1950 the U.S. Navy first utilized the moon as a passive communication satellite in
order to transmit communication traffic between Washington, D.C. and Hawaii. Ever
since that time communication via satellite has become an integral part of the Navy's day to
day operations. Satellite communication has evolved from the rudimentary use of natural
satellites as passive reflectors to the use of active satellites that are capable of on board
processing and amplification of the received signal.
This chapter will discuss some events that were instrumental in the evolution of the
current satellite communication systems. After describing the development and capabilities
of some of the active satellites that are currendy in existence a detailed examination of one
of the first passive satellites will be presented. This will be followed with an introduction
to a proposed Passive Communication Satellite (PACSAT). A detailed technical analysis of
PACSAT will be included in later chapters.
A. CURRENT SYSTEM OF ACTIVE SATELLITES
The current plethora of active satellites has undergone a tremendous metamorphosis
since the first active satellite, Sputnik I was launched in October 1957. Shortly after the
successful launch of Sputnik I the United States reciprocated with the Score satellite which
was placed into orbit in December 1958. Score became the first artificial satellite to be used
to transmit voice communication. President Eisenhower used this satellite to broadcast his
1958 Christmas message. [Ref . Pritchard: p. 3]
Private industry soon joined in the fray when the Bell System developed their first
active communication satellite, Telstar I in July 1962. NASA injected the Telstar I into a
medium altitude elliptical orbit. While higher altitude geosynchronous orbits had first been
proposed by Arthur C. Clark during the 1940's they were not actually attempted until 1963
with the launch of the SYNCOM I satellite. This first attempt at placing a satellite in
synchronous orbit resulted in failure. NASA was able to successfully place the SYNCOM
II and SYNCOM III in synchronous orbit later that same year. [Ref . Pritchard]
A key piece of legislation which was instrumental to the evolution of the satellite
industry was the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. This Act resulted in the formation
of the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) and fostered an environment
conducive to the development of a truly multinational satellite communications program,
Intelsat. In July 1964 one hundred nations joined together to form Intelsat for the purpose
of developing an international satellite communication system. Their first active satellite,
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Early Bird (Intelsat I) was placed into synchronous orbit in April 1965. This series of
satellites has evolved from the Intelsat I with a launch weight of 38.6 Kg and a capacity of
240 voice circuits to the Intelsat VI with a weight of 2,004 Kg and a capacity of about
40,000 voice circuits as well as two television circuits.
1. Mission
Satellites have become so entrenched in our daily lives that we often tend to take
them for granted. They have been used for everything from voice, data and video
communication to earth resource mapping. In short they have become a vital national
resource.
With regard to national defense they are employed both strategically and tactically
on a daily basis. Both Naval battle groups and Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP)
forces rely upon satellites for their intelligence gathering as well as relaying their tactical
and strategic messages. With the proliferation and miniaturization of earth satellite receivers
and transmitters more traditional forms of communication have fallen into disfavor.
While the details and use of any one specific satellite system are varied the
generic applications of communication satellites may be broken down into three primary
mission areas: [Ref. 1: p. 24]
• Multipoint-to-Multipoint (Multiple access)
• Multipoint-to-Point (Data Gathering)
• Point-to-Multipoint (Broadcast).
In a Multipoint-to-Multipoint system there are a number of earth stations within
the satellite's field of view which are using the same satellite to relay information along a
two way communication circuit. An example of such a system would be the Navy's
Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) communication system
With a Multipoint-to-Point system data is gathered by several earth stations and
relayed to one central site where it may be processed and analyzed. Finally, in a Point-to-
Multipoint system information is transmitted via a one way channel from a central earth
transmitter via the satellite to multiple earth receivers. A common example would be the
Navy fleet broadcast
2 . Existing Satellites
Many of today's operational satellites are placed in a geosynchronous orbit of
approximately 35,786 Km to take advantage of their greater field of view. At this altitude
only three satellites are required to provide total earth coverage. An additional advantage to
this configuration is that these satellites can maintain a constant position relative to the
surface of the earth. This simplifies the task of the earth receiver in both acquiring and
tracking the satellite.
While the advantages of a geosynchronous orbit are considerable they do not
come without a price. It is much more difficult and costly to place a satellite into
geosynchronous orbit vice a medium altitude orbit of say 10,000 Km. A geosynchronous
orbit limits both the size of the payload and the type of launch vehicle. Additionally it
increases the propagation delay time as well as the amount of signal loss due to spreading.
While Intelsat VI was initially intended to be launched with either the Ariane or
the Space Shuttle, the Challenger catastrophe as well as the unavailability of the Ariane
(fully scheduled through 1992) has caused Intelsat to seek other means of placing their
heavy satellite into orbit. Intelsat and Glavkosmos have drafted a letter of agreement for
launching the Intelsat VI on a Soviet Protons rocket. This will most likely be a temporary
measure until the United States is able to resume a commercially available heavy launch
schedule. [Ref. 2]
Table 1 provides synoptic data on some of the early and current civilian
communication satellites. [Ref. 1: p. 4-7]
TABLE 1
CIVILIAN COMMUNICATION SATELLITES
System Intelsat I Intelsat VI Telstar
Number of Satellites 2 5 1
Communication 240 voice 40,000 voice N/A
Capacity 1 Television 2 Television
Number of Transponders 2 46 24
Frequency Cband C & Ku band Cband
Mass in Orbit 38.6 Kg 2004 Kg 659 Kg
Design Life 1 8 months 10 years 10 years
Launch 3 stage thrust- Shuttle or Delta 3920
Vehicle augmented Delta Ariane
Table 2 provides a summary of some of the operating characteristics of several
existing military communication satellites. [Ref. 1: p. 14]
TABLE 2
MILITARY COMMUNICATION SATELLITES
System DSCS-2 DSCS-3 Fleetsatcom
Number of Satellites 8 4 5
Number of Transponders 2 7 12
Frequencies X band X & UHF X&UHF
Transponder bandwidth 50 to 185 50 to 85 0.005 to 0.5
(MHz)
Satellite EIRP (dBW) 28 to 40 23 to 40 16.5 to 28
Receive G/T (dB/K) 8.5 to 20 -16to-l -16.6
Satellite Mass 500 Kg 816 Kg 1005 Kg
Design Life (years) 5 10 5
Launch Vehicle Titan m-C Titan 34-D Atlas Centaur
3 . Operational Frequencies
As can be seen from the above the predominant operating frequencies are in the
SHF band of 3 to 30 GHz. While most of the civilian satellites such as Telstar, Intelsat and
Satcom use the C band of frequencies (4 to 8 GHz) the military has opted to use the higher
frequencies of the X band (8 to 12 GHz) in an attempt to gain access to the greater
bandwidth that is available at these frequencies. The UHF frequencies on the DSCS-3 and
Fleetsatcom are used primarily for Tracking, Telemetry and Control (TTC) purposes.
Some of the problems inherent to SHF propagation are increased atmospheric
attenuation due to the gas and water vapor content within the atmosphere. Generally the
higher the frequency the greater the attenuation. Rainfall will also increase the attenuation
and background noise of the downlink signal. For example a heavy rainfall (defined as
15.24 mm/hr) will cause a 4 GHz signal to experience an excess path loss of approximately
0.02 dB/Km while a 1 1 GHz signal will be attenuated by about 0.5 dB/Km. [Ref. 3: p.76]
In later chapters the author will examine the effects that nuclear induced
ionospheric disturbances have upon the propagation of these frequencies.
4 . Cost per Circuit-Year
As can be seen from the above tables the weight of active satellites has increased
with their complexity. The first Intelsat had a beginning of life (BOL) weight of 38.6 Kg.
Intelsat VI has a proposed BOL of 2,004 Kg. This increased weight and complexity is
translated into higher development and launch costs. For example the budget for strategic
and tactical SATCOM (for both satellites and terminals) is in excess of $1 billion dollars
annually. [Ref. 4]
While the overall development costs have increased, the enhanced circuit capacity
and increased longevity of the satellites have improved efficiency and hence reduced the
investment costs per circuit-year. For example when Intelsat I was developed it had a
capacity of 240 telephone circuits and a design life of 1.5 years, which translates into an
investment cost per circuit-year of $32,500 (total investment cost of about $1 1.7 million).
Intelsat V on the other hand has a circuit capacity of 12,000 with a design life of 7 years
which results in an investment cost per circuit-year of only $800 (total investment cost of
about $67.2 million). [Ref. 3: p. 116]
5 . Vulnerability
With the multiplicity of circuits and the high quality of signal transmission the
Navy has come to rely upon active satellites almost to the exclusion of more traditional
forms of communication. However, there has been increasing concern of late that vital
satellite communication may not be as readily available in a hostile environment. Of
particular concern is the degree of communication degradation resulting from jamming of
the downlink signal, loss of satellite integrity due to anti-satellite weapons, and degradation
of the communication link due to a High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP). While
satellites in low to medium altitude orbit are particularly susceptible to anti-satellite
weapons, all active satellite communication systems are vulnerable to the destructive effects
ofHEMP and jamming.
The HEMP effects result from the detonation of a nuclear device within the
earth's atmosphere. This detonation releases high energy X-rays and gamma rays. When
these energy rays interact with air molecules they produce radially moving electrons and
positively charged ions through the Compton effect. These electrons are turned by the
earth's magnetic field and create a transverse current density. This in turn produces a fast
moving electromagnetic pulse within the line of sight of the nuclear burst [Ref. 5: p. 5]
Depending on the magnitude of the weapon and the height of burst
communication equipment may be damaged or disrupted within a 2,000 mile radius. If a
nuclear weapon were to be detonated at an altitude of 500 Km above the center of the
United States the EMP effect would blanket the entire country. [Ref. 6: p. 14]
The solid state circuitry that is used in active satellites is particularly
susceptible to HEMP damage. While solid state electronics have increased the capabilities
and reduced the size of communications systems they are also 1,000 times more vulnerable
than the old vacuum tube technology.
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B . PASSIVE SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT
As was mentioned at the onset of this chapter the moon was the first operational
passive communications satellite. Experimentation in the use of passive communication
satellites continued in 1960 with the launch of the Echo I.
In 1963 the Westford experiment was conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of using
a large cloud of orbiting metallic strips sized so as to act as half wavelength dipole
antennas. This experiment was based on the same principle that is used today in the
deployment of "chaff for electronic countermeasures. These half wavelength dipoles acted
as a reflective surface for passive communication signals. The Westford experiment was
doomed from the start due to environmental considerations as well as the successful launch
of Syncom, the first geostationary satellite. Syncom's success eclipsed the efforts of
subsequent attempts at achieving an operational passive satellite system. [Ref. 7: p. 9]
The Westford experiment was followed in 1964 by the launch of the Echo n, a large
pressurized balloon that acted as a passive reflector. Finally in 1966 the deployment of the
OVI 8, a wire mesh sphere that measured 30 feet in diameter, marked the last experimental
effort at producing a passive satellite communication system.
While passive satellites have fallen into disfavor some of their characteristics which




• survivability in a hostile environment
• ability to operate over a wide frequency range
• simultaneous access by multiple users
• ability to change the operating frequencies, bandwidth and modulation methods once in
orbit
• independence from the ionosphere for signal propagation
• resistant to active jamming by hostile forces
The advantages as well as disadvantages will be closely examined throughout the
course of this thesis to determine if a passive satellite system may be used effectively in
todays strategic environment.
The next few sections will provide a brief description of the Echo I and Echo II
systems and then present a description of a new breed of passive communications satellites,
PACSAT. A more detailed technical analysis of the PACSAT system will be presented in
later chapters.
1. Echo I
The Echo I was designed as a non-stressed spherical system. It was nothing
more than an inflatable balloon with a 100 foot diameter. The balloon was placed into orbit
in 1960 and was still in orbit in 1965 during the time frame in which the Echo II was
tested.
The Echo I was tracked with radar in order to determine its effective backscatter
area. Test results indicated that it had a backscatter radiation pattern or radar cross section
of 20.6 dB/m2 as compared to 31 dB for the Echo II. The Echo I suffered from a higher
frequency scintillation and a greater signal dispersion than its successor the Echo II.
The overall performance of the Echo I satellite system was dependent upon the
surface quality that was presented to a communications or radar signal. This surface
quality varied greatly depending upon the surface stress resulting from the satellite's spin
and the expansion and distortion that was experienced as a result of thermal stresses. [Ref.
8]
2 . Echo II
Echo II was launched on January 25, 1964 into a 800 mile circular orbit with an
inclination of 82 degrees. The satellite system was designed to determine how a stressed
spherical reflector would perform as a passive communication relay. During the test and
evaluation phase one of the key properties that needed to be evaluated was how the
satellite's backscatter characteristics or radar cross section affected communications.
a. Physical Characteristics
The satellite was constructed of 106 panels that were composed of
intermixed layers of aluminum and Mylar film. The actual structure is depicted in Figure








Figure 2.1 Physical Characteristics of the Echo II
During the ground testing phase of the Echo II experiment the balloon was
inflated from ambient surface pressures up through 12,000 psi. Measurements of the radar
cross section were then taken at 1.7 and 5.85 GHz. It was determined that once launched
the satellite would achieve a Radar Cross Section (RCS) of 30 dB.
b. Operating Characteristics
Once the Echo II was launched it was tracked by 18 radar facilities to
determine its operational RCS. The radar facilities tracked the satellite over a frequency
band ranging from VHF up through 10 GHz. Measurements were then taken of the fading
rate at a specified carrier frequency as well as the scintillation and RCS.
While the satellite was designed to be stressed in the range of 5,000 to
6,000 psi it was only able to achieve a pressure of 1,000 psi after launch. This resulted in
a higher scintillation level than was originally calculated. As was the case with the Echo I
the electromagnetic characteristics of the returned signal were dependent upon the surface
quality of the satellite.
Empirical data showed a periodic drop in the RCS. It was determined that
this drop was the result of an unexpected rotation of the satellite with a spin period of
approximately 100 seconds. Additionally the observed scintillation was evaluated as being
caused by the reduced skin stress and surface distortions that were caused by the balloon's
rotation. [Ref. 8: p. 18]
The fading rates that were calculated were based upon the operation of a
high quality voice communication system with a 20 KHz bandwidth. The system
parameters were such that it required a signal to noise ratio of 25 dB to operate successfully
under FM modulation. The receiving and transmitting antenna had a diameter of 60 feet
and the transmitter power (Pt) was rated at 1 Kw. With this configuration the minimum
RCS capable of supporting a 25 dB signal/noise figure was a function of the transmission
frequency and was approximated by:
Gm = 103^2 (eqn2.1)
The fading rate, which is defined as the percentage of time that the RCS is




Carrier Fading Rate Fading Rate
Frequency (60 ft. antenna) (40 ft. antenna)
0.3 GHz 76% 90%
2 GHz 3% 8%
5 GHz 0.05% 0.5%
Based upon this the satellite was evaluated to be able to act as an effective
communications relay system with frequencies greater than or equal to 2 GHz while
employing frequency modulation techniques. Its performance was reduced by scintillation
induced noise when amplitude modulation techniques were employed.
c. Communication Test Results
From 21 February to 8 March 1964 a communications experiment was
conducted using the Echo II satellite for a communications relay between the Jodrell Bank
Observatory in the United Kingdom and Zimenki in the Soviet Union. Based upon a one
Kw transmitter operating at a carrier frequency of 162.4 MHz calculations prior to the
experiment indicated that the received signal to noise ratio (SNR) should be about 12.2 dB
above the receiver threshold. The experiment configuration and calculations are shown in
Figure 2.2. [Ref. 8: p. 24]
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Figure 2.2 Echo II Expected Performance
While expected SNRs were nominally achieved there was considerable
variation in signal quality due to scintillation. Best results occurred when both the
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transmitter and receiver antennas were at maximum elevation angles. Signal degradations
became more evident when transmission occurred at low elevation angles and during
multipath reception.
C. PACSAT: A NEW DESIGN IN PASSIVE SATELLITES
The Passive Communications Satellite is not an operational satellite system. PACSAT
is a research project whose purpose is to design and evaluate a constellation of passive
communication satellites. The project is sponsored by the Strategic Technology Office of
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and it is being conducted by
the Rand Corporation. [Ref. 7]
The following is a brief description of the proposed mission and operational
characteristics of the satellite. A detailed discussion concerning the link parameters and
path calculations will be presented in later chapters.
1 . Mission
The proposed mission for this satellite system would be strategic in nature and
categorized as being point-to-multipoint or broadcast in application. PACSAT would be
used to augment the existing Minimum Essential Emergency Communication Network
(MEECN). Its primary mission would be to transmit an Emergency Action Message
(EAM) from the National Command Authority (NCA) to the various Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP) forces.
Some of the existing MEECN systems include the Emergency Rocket
Communication System (ERCS), the SAC Digital Network (SACDIN) and, the Air Force
Satellite Communication System (AFSATCOM). As part of the MEECN system PACSAT
would be expected to provide reliable communications in a hostile environment under
conditions of active jamming and possible ionospheric disturbances resulting from a
nuclear burst.
2 . Description
The Passive Communication Satellite is envisioned as being totally passive
without any capability of amplifying or processing the received signal. In order to maintain
its passive qualities orbital stability will be attained by using the earth's gravity gradients.
This will eliminate the need for the transmission of any corrective Tracking, Telemetry and
Control (TTC) signal from the earth stations or the satellite.
PACSAT will operate predominantly within the SHF frequency band with a
nominal carrier frequency of 8 to 10 Ghz. It will employ frequency hopping over a 360
MHz band of the communications spectrum in order to both steer the return signal and
provide jamming resistance. The signal which is returned by the satellite is in the shape of
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a hollow cone or annulus. One is able to steer the annulus and thereby move the satellite
antenna's footprint by selecting the appropriate frequency. The configuration if this return











Figure 2.3 PACSAT Link Configuration
The satellite array consists of a long string of spherical scattering elements. Both
the size and number of these elements are chosen so as to enhance the backscattering
characteristics and therefore the directivity and gain of the entire array. The array may vary
in length from 154 meters to 1.5 Km. It may be divided into as few as 100 or as many as
1000 sections each of which is about 1.5 meters long.
3 . Orbital Placement
The altitude at which the satellite is placed in orbit will depend upon several
factors:
• acceptable signal loss due to propagation
• desired area of coverage
• number of satellites within the constellation
• propagation time
• satellite tracking capabilities of intended earth receivers
15
The predominant criteria for a passive communication system is the amount of
propagation loss which may be sustained without reducing the communication reliability.
Because of this PACSAT will not be in geostationary orbit and will most likely operate at
an altitude of between 6,000 and 10,000 Km.
The rate of transmission will be predicated upon the acceptable bit error rate for
the received message. Generally the slower the transmission rate the better the quality of
the received signal.
4 . Comparison with Active Satellites
Due to advances in electronic miniaturization, increasingly more complex on
board signal processing capabilities have been incorporated into active satellite designs.
The increased capabilities of active satellites has decreased the required complexities of
earth bound receivers while at the same time reducing the per circuit-year operating costs.
These advances have not come without cost. Due to the sensitivity of the
electronic components the satellites have had to be hardened both physically and
electronically so as to survive in a hostile environment. Passive satellites, due to their
simple design, are less susceptible to physical attack than their active counterparts.
Additionally a high altitude electromagnetic pulse will not incapacitate a passive satellite.
Uplink jamming is a significant concern for active satellite systems. Not so for
passive satellites. Because a passive system does not amplify the received signal it will not
be susceptible to saturation or intermodulation of the traveling wave tube amplifiers
(TWTA). The circuit elements are basically linear and hence resistant to uplink jamming.
[Ref. 10: p. 2]
Due to the absence of active components, the PACSAT system enjoys the
advantages of simplicity, economy, survivability, and reliability. Additionally since there
are no active components to wear out or to degrade as a result of radiation damage the
passive system should experience an extended operational life.
One of the most significant disadvantages for any passive communications
satellite is the weakness of the returned signal. As was stated earlier, this reduced signal
strength will affect the design of the satellite's orbit, area of earth coverage and the speed at
which the message may be transmitted. These limitations will in turn be a major factor in
determining the mission for which this communications platform is best suited.
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III. NUCLEAR EFFECTS UPON ELECTROMAGNETIC
PROPAGATION
The effectiveness of any military communication system must be evaluated in light of
the worst case scenario. Of particular concern is the system's reliability and survivability in
a hostile environment. If a passive or active satellite communication system is to operate
reliably it must be able to function in an environment stressed by a nuclear detonation.
This chapter will describe some of the environmental perturbations caused by the
detonation of a nuclear weapon within the earth's atmosphere. Of particular interest will be
the changes in the ionosphere's electron density and ionization level and how this variation
from the norm affects the communication spectrum. This chapter will also stress the effects
of increased absorption and thermally induced noise upon a satellite link.
While the majority of the existing satellites operate in the SHF band this chapter will
explore the possibility of using the HF band for satellite communications. Specifically it
will examine the deterioration of the HF band due to increased ionization in both the
traditional ionospheric propagation mode as well as a possible satellite communication path.
The majority of the information in this chapter dealing with the analysis and effects of
a nuclear blast was derived from Glasstone's book, "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons"
[Ref. 11].
A. ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
While this chapter is primarily concerned with propagation problems a related affect
that is also caused by the detonation of a nuclear weapon within the atmosphere is the
generation of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). This pulse is caused by the prompt release
of high energy X-rays and gamma rays. When these high energy rays interact with the
surrounding air molecules they produce radially moving electrons and positively charged
ions through the Compton affect. These electrons are turned by the earth's magnetic field
and create a transverse current density. This current produces a fast moving
electromagnetic pulse which can attain a peak energy of about 50 Kv/m within 10 ns [Ref.
5: p. 5].
The EMP poses a threat to satellite communications as it can be coupled to exposed
antennas. Once this strong current has been collected by the antenna it may then be
transmitted to the receiving equipment via the various power and transmission lines. These
cable transients may then cause disruption and/or destructive currents and voltages at the
connection pins of the receiving equipment.
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Since the main thrust if this chapter deals with propagation problems and due to the
scope and complexity of EMP it will not be discussed in any further detail. Also, latter
chapters will show that EMP is less of a problem for passive satellites than for active ones.
B . CLASSIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR BURST
Before getting into a detailed description of the effects of a nuclear blast the three
classifications of a nuclear burst will be described. Each category will be discussed in light
if its ability to generate an electromagnetic pulse.
1 . Surface Burst
If the weapon detonation takes place within 2 Km (1.2 mi.) of the earth's surface
it is classified as a surface burst. In this situation the range and intensity of the
Electromagnetic Pulse will be greatly curtailed due to the absorption of the gamma rays by
the earth's surface. The Compton electrons will only travel a short distance in the air
before they are absorbed. However, the earth will act as an alternate transmission path for
mis electron field. The magnitude of this field is inversely proportional to the distance from
the blast. Ranges will be dependent upon weapon yield but are generally restricted to 3-6
Km.
Communication interference will occur in the area surrounding the mushroom
cloud due to the presence of suspended particulate matter. The suspended debris will tend
to disrupt the upper frequency spectrum, VHF and UHF [Ref Hill, C: HEMP paper].
Additionally the sudden release of large amounts of thermal radiation results in an increased
ionization of the surrounding atmosphere. This results in increased absorption of the lower
communication frequencies [Ref. 11].
2 . Air Burst
An air burst will be produced when detonation occurs within 2-20 Km (1.2-
12.4 mi.) of the earth's surface. Due to the relatively high air density within this altitude
range, gamma rays and Compton electrons will only travel short distances. The net EMP
effect is even less than that in the surface burst scenario due to the fact that the earth no
longer provides a transmission path for the free flowing electrons.
As in the previous case communication difficulties arise when the transmission
path traverses the area of the burst [Ref Hill, C: HEMP paper].
3. High Altitude Burst
A high altitude burst is the result of a weapon detonating 20 Km or more above
sea level. When the gamma rays which are emitted in a downward direction encounter
regions of denser atmosphere (at about 20 Km) Compton electrons are produced.
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Detonation of a large yield nuclear weapon above 20 Km will produce the most sever EMP
effects.
C. IONOSPHERIC EFFECTS
The effects of a nuclear blast on a satellite communication system is a function of the
blasts yield, altitude, distance from the communication path and the time after the
detonation. The geometry between the detonation site and the communication path also
comes into play. The severity of signal attenuation is not only affected by the distance from
the blast site but also by the number of times that the propagation path intersects the
disturbed regions of the ionosphere.
The effects of a nuclear detonation are not homogeneous throughout the ionosphere.
There is a great deal variability due to the different levels of ionization within the various
regions or layers of the atmosphere. These layers are discussed below.
1 . Ionospheric Layers
The various layers within the ionosphere have been designated D, E, F\, F2 and
have been categorized according to their maximum levels of ionization. The ionization
within a docile environment is primarily due to high energy ultraviolet radiation from the
sun striking the upper regions of the atmosphere and liberating electrons and positive ions
from the air molecules. Under normal conditions the electron density varies inversely with
the angle of the sun with greater levels of ionization occurring at equatorial latitudes. The
ionization level is also a function of the sunspot cycle and the solar flare activity. The ion
density is greater for all layers during the daylight hours. As we will see the ion density is
primarily responsible for the attenuation or refraction of an incident electromagnetic wave.
The D region is the closest layer to the surface of the earth with an average
altitude of 70 to 90 Km above sea level (ASL). The level of ionization in this region is
dependent upon the angle of incidence of the sun and is therefore at a maximum at local
noon and disappears during the night. As can be seen from Figure 3.1 [Ref. 11: p. 463]
the D region has the smallest electron density of any of the other layers. Under normal
atmospheric conditions this region will affect the communications spectrum by absorbing
low frequency signals. However, with certain combinations of weapon yield and



















ELECTROH DEHSITY (ELECTROHS/CH 5 )
Figure 3.1 Electron Densities in D, E and F Regions
The E layer is the next region in the ionosphere and varies in altitude from 100 to
200 Km. It has a higher level of ionization than the D layer but it too is highly dependent
upon the sun's activity and demonstrates distinct seasonal and diurnal changes. Its
maximum ionization occurs at local noon and will dissipate shortly after sunset.
A transitory phenomena known as the Sporadic E may also occur. The exact
causes for the Sporadic E layer are not known but it has been associated with large squall
line thunderstorms, meteor showers, and auroral substorms. The Sporadic E is an area of
very high electron density which may extend over hundreds of kilometers. On occasion a
Blanketing Sporadic E layer may develop an electron density high enough to prevent
electromagnetic transmissions from reaching the F layer above it. [Ref. 12: p. 22]
The highest layer, designated as the F layer, extends upward from about 300
Km. However, during the day the ionization level increases to the point that it separates
into two distinct layers. The lower layer, the F| layer starts at about 175 to 250 Km while
the upper layer, F2 starts at about 300 Km ASL. The actual altitude of the F2 layer varies
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with the season and is actually higher in the summer than the winter. The two layers
combine at night at a lower altitude of about 150 to 250 Km.
As can be seen from Figure 3.1 the F layer contains the greatest electron density.
The electron density at the Control Point, that region of the ionosphere that is encountered
by a transiting electromagnetic wave, is responsible for the refraction of some HF band
transmissions below a specified critical frequency.
2 . Scintillation Affects
Scintillation is caused by a non homogeneous ionosphere and irregular F region.
These irregularities result from disturbances in the ion density that align themselves along
the earth's magnetic lines of flux. The disturbances are roughly cylindrical in shape with
diameters of 100 to 1000 feet and may affect an area of the ionosphere from 25 to 2000
miles in diameter [Ref. 13]. In the presence of scintillation electromagnetic signals
experience random variations in both amplitude and phase. This results in an enhancing
and fading effect upon HF, VHF, and UHF transmissions.
Under normal atmospheric conditions scintillation is a function of the latitude,
season, time of day and sun spot activity. The most pronounced effects occur
approximately one to two hours after sunrise with activity increasing during the spring and
fall equinox. As we will see, the focusing and defocusing of the electromagnetic spectrum
due to scintillation may also be produced by a nuclear detonation.
3 . Prompt Radiation
As much as three quarters of the energy released by a nuclear detonation is
expended by ionizing the surrounding atmosphere. Ionization may be caused by the
interaction of surrounding atmosphere with the gamma rays, neutrons or X-rays that are
released at the onset of the nuclear burst. It may also result from residual radiation that is
released from beta particles, gamma rays and, positive ions from the weapon debris itself.
The ultraviolet component of thermal radiation will also cause an increase in the ionization
surrounding the fireball. [Ref. 1 1 : p. 466]
The increased ionization will gradually dissipate in one of two ways, attachment
with neutral particles or recombination with other ions. Attachment is the primary means of
dissipation at lower altitudes where neutral particles, primarily molecular oxygen, are in
greater abundance. For surface bursts and low altitude air bursts the relatively high air
density prevents the widespread dispersal of atomic debris thereby containing the ionization
levels. Free ions in the upper atmosphere are removed by combining electrons with
positive ions.
The electron density of the D layer will increase dramatically if the ionizing
radiation and the positive ions of the weapon debris can reach its altitude. Because of its
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low atmospheric density and the dearth of positive ions within the D layer the resulting
ionization will dissipate very slowly. The greatest effects will be evident in a 10 mile band
centered around an altitude of 40 miles ASL.
The primary components of prompt radiation are X-rays which account for 70%
of the explosive energy released as prompt radiation and neutrons which account for 1% of
the energy; a negligible portion (3/10%) are the result of gamma rays. This in turn will
produce a total electron density (Ne) which may be approximated by equation 3.1. [Ref.
11: p. 496]




In equation 3.1 the weapon yield in kilotons is designated as W, D is the distance
of the observation point from the detonation, p is the air density in grams per cubic
centimeter, k is the energy constant associated with the type of radiation (i.e. 0.7 for X-
rays) and F(M) is the effective mass absorption coefficient which is a function of the
radiations penetration mass (the air mass per unit area that lies between the blast and the
observation site).
Figure 3.2 [Ref. 11: p. 499] shows the result of equation 3.1 once the electron
densities (Ne) have been summed for the various types of radiation energy. The electron
densities shown are for the D region (approximately 40 miles ASL) of the ionosphere and
are the result of the prompt radiation produced by a one megaton blast detonated at the
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Figure 3.2 Electron Density From Prompt Radiation
As can be seen in equation 3.1 the electron density resulting from prompt
radiation is directly proportional to the yield (W) of the weapon. With this in mind once the
burst altitude and the horizontal distance from the burst site have been established, the Ne
can be derived from Figure 3.2 for any size yield.
For example, if a 500 kiloton blast is detonated at an altitude of 20 miles to what
extent will the D layer experience an electron density equal to IO5? The desired Ne must
first be scaled by the appropriate weapons yield as is shown in equation 3.2.
Ne( 1MT) = £^§52- = qj = 2 x IO5 electrons/CM3W (eqn 3.2)
Entering Figure 3.2 with the value from equation 3.2 we see that it intersects the curve
approximating the 20 mile burst altitude at approximately 190 miles. [Ref. 1 1: p. 498]
While the normal electron density for the D layer is approximately IO3
electrons/CM3 during the day and zero at night, Figure 3.2 shows that Ne can attain levels
in excess of IO9 electrons/CM3 . Ne values in excess of IO4 are sufficient to cause
increased attenuation of the electromagnetic spectrum.
The rate at which the electron density is removed from the D region may be
approximated by the following equations [Ref. 1 1: p. 501]:
Nc(t) at 40 miles
-
1
; + ff% ] (daytime) (eqn 3.3)
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Ne(t) at 55 miles =
Ne(0)
_1 + {2x 10- 7N e (0)t}
(nighttime) (eqn 3.4)
As can be seen from the above, the electron density remaining is inversely
proportional to the product of the initial electron density, Ne(0) and the elapsed time in
seconds after the burst. The result of equations 3.3 and 3.4 is that regardless of the value
of Ne(0) the electron density in the D region caused by prompt ionization will drop below
103 electrons/cm3 within three hours of the blast. This relationship is depicted in Figure
3.3. It must be stressed that Figure 3.3 shows the ionization decay resulting only from the
prompt radiation effects. It does not take into account the affects of delayed radiation.
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Figure 3.3 Electron Density Decay
The burst altitude will determine to a large extent the degree to which the various
atmospheric layers are affected by prompt radiation. If an air burst occurs below 10 miles
altitude the majority of the blast energy will be deposited within the vicinity of the fireball.
This will cause the electron density within the fireball to exceed 109 electrons/cm3 for up to
3 to 4 minutes. Temperatures in excess of 2,500SK will also cause thermal ionization of the
surrounding atmosphere. The D region will remain unaffected by prompt radiation. This
is due to the fact that the burst is well below the stopping altitude of X-rays (35-55 miles),
and neutrons and gamma rays (15 miles). Any ionization of the D region at this burst
altitude will be due to the effects of delayed radiation.
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With a nuclear detonation occurring between 10 to 40 miles altitude the X-rays
produced by the prompt radiation will primarily be confined to the fireball. Ionization of
the surrounding atmosphere and the D region will be caused by the release of neutrons.
The fireball itself will be ionized to a level of 107 electrons/cm3 for up to 3 minutes. The
area affected by this level of ionization will be greater than in the previous case but its
spread will be limited by the curvature of the earth. For example a one megaton blast
detonated at 40 miles ASL will produce an electron density of between 104 and 105
electrons/cm3 up to a horizontal distance of about 550 miles [Ref. 12: p. 33].
If the burst altitude is between 40 to 65 miles X-rays will cause the majority of
the prompt radiation. This is due to the fact that the blast altitude is greater than the
stopping distance for X-rays. Since X-rays account for up to 70% of the energy released
by prompt radiation the D region will be affected to a much greater extent.
At burst altitudes in excess of 40 miles the E region will be irradiated by the X-
rays released from the prompt radiation. This will result in the rapid ionization of the E
region with a rather prolonged recovery time. The overall effect will be similar to the
sporadic E mentioned above.
4 . Delayed Radiation
Delayed radiation is the result of energy being emitted in the form of beta and
gamma radiation from the radioactive debris of the nuclear explosion. This delayed
radiation will then proceed to cause an increase in the ionization of the surrounding
atmosphere in much the same manner as described above. The duration of the ionization as
well as the area affected is dependent upon the yield and the burst altitude of the weapon.
If the burst altitude is below 10 miles the cloud of radioactive debris will remain
fairly close to the fireball. Due to the high air density in this region of the atmosphere the
life expectancy of free electrons is short. This is primarily due to their high rate of
attachment to neutral particles. Upper regions of the ionosphere are not affected unless the
fireball pushes the radioactive debris above the 15 mile stopping altitude of gamma
radiation. If this should occur then there would be an increase in the D layers ionization.
Delayed radiation becomes significant if the burst altitude is between 10 to 40
miles. At this altitude the atmosphere is thin enough so that the fireball can propel
radioactive debris up to 20 miles above the blast point. The radius of the debris cloud will
then increase at a rate of approximately 100 miles per hour [Ref. 14: p. 285].
If the debris is below 35 miles gamma rays will be the primary cause for the
ionization of the D layer. Below this altitude the secondary source of delayed radiation,
beta particles, are prevented from expanding beyond the debris area.
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Once the debris reaches an altitude in excess of 40 miles the electrically charged
beta particles will spiral along the earth's geomagnetic field into the opposite magnetic
hemisphere and irradiate the conjugate area of the ionosphere. The total level of ionization
caused by the beta particles is equally distributed between the blast site and the conjugate
area. Meanwhile gamma rays are not restricted by the earth's magnetic lines of flux and
will continue to spread about the blast site. The ionization caused by the gamma radiation
is less intense than the beta particles and dissipates with increased altitude. This situation is
depicted in Figure 3.4 [Ref. 1 1: p. 473].










Figure 3.4 Dispersal of Beta Particles
As the beta particles are spread along the earth's magnetic lines they cause
irregularities in the surrounding ionosphere. These irregularities will form arcs or tubes of
varying electron densities similar to those resulting from the natural forces that can create
scintillation affects.
If the detonation occurs above 70 miles radioactive debris can be propelled
hundreds of miles above the blast point At extreme altitudes the electrically charged debris
can cause the geomagnetic field to stretch before it The debris may continue to expand for
hundreds of miles before it is stopped by the pressure of the magnetic field. It will then
proceed to fall and irradiate the D region from above. Additionally beta particles which
have been trapped by the earth's magnetic field will continue to irradiate the area between
the blast site and the conjugate area. As these field lines move eastward they will within a
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few hours form a shell of high energy beta particles (electrons) around the entire earth [Ref.
11: p. 478].
The rate at which the electron density is dissipated is dependent upon the time of
day and the altitude and yield of the weapon. In general the electron density will be higher
for a blast that occurs during the day than at night. Additionally while the area affected is
larger for a high altitude burst (40 - 70 miles) the electron density of the D region is less
than would be the case if the burst altitude was between 10 to 40 miles. Figures 3.5 and
3.6 show the electron density of the D region and the debris radius over time for a one
megaton explosion [Ref. 12: p. 36]. In Figure 3.5 the blast altitude is in the range of 10 to
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Figure 3.6 Delayed Radiation Affects on D Region Burst 40-70 mi.
Direct ionization is not the only means by which the ionosphere's electron
density may be affected. The hydrodynamic (shock) and hydromagnetic effects of a
nuclear blast will change the electron density of the E and F region of the atmosphere. As
the shock wave propagates through the atmosphere it ionizes the surrounding air. During
the compression stage of the shock wave the electron density increases due to the
decreasing volume. However as the air expands due to the heating caused by compression,
an expansion phase may cause the electron density to be reduced below normal levels.
This was evident during the TEAK megaton range burst that was detonated at an altitude of
40 miles. As the shock waves from the blast encountered the E and F regions the electron
density was observed to first increase and then decrease below normal until after sunrise.
[Ref. 11: p. 478]
D. EFFECTS UPON THE COMMUNICATION SPECTRUM
A nuclear blast will have several debilitating effects upon the communications
spectrum. Foremost of these is attenuation via absorption. There will also be an increase




Thermal radiation from the nuclear blast is the primary cause for the increased
atmospheric noise. The temperatures generated around the fireball may remain in excess of
1,0009 K for several minutes. This may result in a significant contribution to the overall
system temperature (noise level) of a low temperature satellite receiver system particularly if
the directive antenna is aimed at the region of the fireball.
A secondary source of atmospheric noise is synchrotron radiation. This
radiation is the result of beta particles that are trapped along the earth's magnetic lines of
flux. As these particles travel between the conjugate and the blast site they will generate
synchrotron radiation at right angles to their line of propagation. The intensity of this
radiation is inversely proportional to frequency. While less intense than thermal radiation,
synchrotron radiation noise may cause significant deterioration of low frequency
communications systems. [Ref. 11: p. 480]
2 . Refraction and Scattering
According to Snell's law as an electromagnetic wave passes through a plane of
differing densities it will be refracted back toward the area of higher density. The index of
refraction (n) is inversely proportional to the velocity of the electromagnetic wave through a
medium. The index of refraction has been defined as unity in a vacuum and approximately
1.0003 for normal ambient air. This index may be approximated by equation 3.5 [Ref. 11:
p. 493]
n = 1- N 'w& W (eqn 3.5)
As can be seen from the above n is directly proportional to the electron density
and inversely proportional to the square of the frequency. In a highly ionized atmosphere
this may result in n being significantly less than unity. In such a situation the
electromagnetic wave will be refracted back toward the region of higher n. If the satellite
uplink frequency passes through a heavily ionized region of the D layer it may be refracted
back toward the surface of the earth. The same situation may arise with respect to the
satellite downlink frequency. Since the satellite downlink is normally transmitted at a lower
frequency it is more susceptible to changes in the index of refraction. In extreme cases this
reduced index may result in the downlinked frequency being bent back toward free space.
The net result will be a shadow zone around the D layer. This area would be relatively
impermeable to certain radio frequencies due to its low index of refraction (high electron
density). Such a shadow zone is depicted in Figure 3.7.
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Imaged Lajer
Figure 3.7 Shadow Zone
Equation 3.5 may be manipulated so as to determine the highest frequency which
will be refracted by a given electron density. This critical frequency in megahertz is
approximated by equation 3.6 [Ref. 1 1: p. 493].
fcr =10-2VN7sec<j> (eqn 3.6)
Where <{> is the communications transmission angle measured from the vertical.
The critical frequency increases as the transmission angle is displaced from the vertical
.
This is significant for terrestrial communications systems and satellite systems that are not
in geosynchronous orbit.
The critical frequency is also directly proportional to the electron density. As the
electron density increases due to either prompt or delayed radiation a larger portion of the
communication spectrum will be refracted back toward the surface of the earth. Even if the
electron density is not sufficient to totally refract the electromagnetic wave back toward the
surface of the earth it may be high enough to bend it from its original path. This may result
in an increased pointing error and a reduced signal to noise ratio in satellite communication
systems.
The D layer may become so ionized that HF frequencies which are normally
refracted at the much higher F layer may in fact be refracted at the lower altitude of the D
layer. This reduced refraction altitude will cause a disruption of established terrestrial
communications systems.
After a nuclear detonation the increase in electron density is not distributed
uniformly throughout the affected area. As was mentioned above the immediate area of the
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burst will be affected by prompt radiation and the thermal radiation within the fireball and
will therefore exhibit the highest electron density. Areas surrounding the blast site as well
as the conjugate area will be affected by the rate of dispersal of the radioactive debris.
These irregularities in the electron density may result in the scattering of the
communications signal. If the signal's propagation path traverses areas of varying electron
density the signal may be refracted to varying degrees resulting in the scattering of the
signal and a reduction of the overall signal strength. Scattering will often occur when the
signal's transmission path passes through one of the earth's magnetic lines of flux which
have been charged by the spiraling beta particles depicted in Figure 3.4. When this occurs
the signal will undergo random changes in amplitude and phase similar to the scintillation
effect discussed earlier.
Scattering of the communication signal may also result in multipath interference
at the receiver. This interference is accentuated by the fact that the received signal will
undergo phase changes as it is being refracted. Random changes in the received signal's
phase will induce added noise into the receiving equipment; reducing the signal to noise
ratio.
Not only is the signal to noise ratio reduced but for wide bandwidth
communications systems the effective bandwidth could also be reduced. In a wide
bandwidth system the phase of the various frequencies which make up the bandwidth may
be randomly changed due to refraction and scattering. Since changes in the index of
refraction (n) over time will change the velocity at which the signal is propagated, a
wideband signal passing through a region of fluctuating n will undergo a shift in frequency
due to the Doppler effect; thereby causing interference with adjacent channels.
3. Absorption
Absorption of electromagnetic energy is the primary cause for signal attenuation
after a nuclear burst. As we will see absorption is direcdy proportional to the electron
density and inversely proportional to the square of the frequency. Because of this signal
attenuation is more significant for low frequency communications systems. Electron
densities in excess of 104 electrons/cm3 are sufficient to cause degradation of the lower
frequencies of the HF band. As can be seen in Figure 3.3 densities in excess of 104 which
were caused by prompt radiation alone may be expected to last for approximately 5
minutes. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that electron densities above this level may be
maintained for several hours after the blast. Due to the intense ionization of the atmosphere
within the fireball, this region may be rendered essentially opaque to all electromagnetic
transmissions below 10 Ghz for several minutes [Ref. 1 1: p. 488].
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The D region will cause the greatest attenuation of an electromagnetic signal after
a nuclear detonation. The reason for this is that the rate of free electron removal via
attachment and recombination is lower here than in any of the layers above or below it.
Within the F layer there are a greater number of free flowing ions to recombine with the
released electrons and in the lower atmosphere the atmospheric density is greater so that
attachment becomes an effective means for electron removal.
An additional factor which affects the rate of absorption is the frequency at which
the electrons collide with other particles, i.e., ions, molecules or atoms. This frequency or
'V is proportional to the air density. The atmospheric density decreases with altitude in
accordance with the following approximation:
p(h) - poe-h/4 -3 g/cm3 (eqn 3.7)
In equation 3.7 p(h) is the air density at altitude h and po is the air density at sea
level. The value 4.3 is the scaling factor for altitudes less than 60 miles. If 'e' in equation
3.7 is converted to base 10 (10"2 -3 ) a simple rule of thumb may be used to approximate the
changes in air density below 60 miles, for every 10 mile increase in altitude the air density
is reduced by a factor of 10. At an altitude of 40 miles the air density will be 10"4 times that
at sea level. With this in mind we see that the collision frequency will decrease
exponentially with altitude. [Ref. 1 1: p. 491]






By virtue of the fact that the collision frequency (V) is represented in equation
3.8 in both the numerator and the denominator it will reduce the absorption value at both
altitude extremes. If the collision frequency is high, which is the case at lower altitudes
then the V2 term in the denominator will cause 'a' to be small. If V is very small (high
altitude, low atmospheric density) then the V in the numerator will be predominant and
cause 'a' to be small. Therefore, once again the region of the atmosphere which is most
affected by absorption is the D region.
If the frequency of transmission is greater than 10 MHz then co2 » V2 and the
V2 term may be dropped from the denominator. Additionally, since our primary concern
will be the level of absorption within the D layer, we can use the fact that at an altitude of
40 miles V = 2 x 10"7 collisions/sec. Converting the frequency in radians to megahertz the
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absorption values may then be approximated by equation 3.9 [Ref. 11: p. 492]. This
equation was used in constructing the absorption curves shown in Figure 3.8.
a = 4x 10"2 Ne
f2
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Figure 3.8 D-Region Absorption
In equation 3.9 if the quotient
N,
£2
is sufficiently large then the electromagnetic
wave may be both attenuated and refracted. The predominant affect will be dependent upon
the ratio of the rate of change in Ne with altitude (Z) and the collision frequency: —y—. If
the ratio is large then refraction will be predominate but if it is small, as is the case at low
altitudes, then signal attenuation will be the primary affect.
E. EFFECTS UPON THE HF SPECTRUM
Under normal ionospheric conditions the maintenance of a successful HF terrestrial
link is dependent upon two things, the Maximum Usable Frequency (MUF) and the
Lowest Usable Frequency (LUF). These two quantities form an upper and lower bound
respectively upon the usable frequencies. The MUF is a function of the critical frequency
and the angle of transmission while the LUF is a function of absorption. Both quantities
will vary during the day with their highest values occurring between the hours of sunrise
and sunset. This is due to the normal increase in the electron density caused by the sun's
rays. The dependency of the MUF and the LUF on the electron density may be seen by
reviewing equations 3.6 and 3.9 respectively.
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Normal operating conditions dictate that an HF ionospheric communications link
would be maintained at a frequency near the MUF. Communications links at this
frequency would reduce the probability of multipath interference while still using a
frequency that is capable of being refracted back to the earth by the higher electron densities
of the F layer.
In a nuclear environment the electron density of the F layer is first increased and
subsequently reduced. This is especially true when a large yield weapon is detonated at
night above 65 miles in altitude [Ref. 1 1: p. 486]. This reduction in ionization will prohibit
a HF signal from being bent back to the surface of the earth. Rather than being refracted by
the F layer it will continue to propagate out into free space. This may prove useful if an HF
link was used for satellite communications. However, prior to arriving at the F layer the
communications signal must first transit the highly ionized D region. Figure 3.5 shows up
to one hour after the blast Ne = 106 electrons/cm3 . Assuming a worst case situation with a
communication satellite in a non geosynchronous orbit and requiring a maximum
transmission angle of 239 , equation 3.6 shows that the transmission frequency would have
to be greater than approximately 10.9 MHz in order to pass through the D region.
Another factor that must be taken into account is the degree of degradation of the signal
to noise ratio due to attenuation. During high sun spot activity in a non nuclear
environment, the LUF may be increased to the point that it exceeds the MUF. In these
situations there is a total blackout for normal ionospheric propagation of the HF band. A
similar situation arises immediately after a nuclear burst. Figure 3.2 shows that the prompt
radiation released after the burst may cause the electron density to increase beyond 109
electrons/cm3 . This in turn would cause a blackout within the area of the burst
Returning to our original example, if an HF satellite communications link at a
frequency of 10.9 MHz passes through the 10 mile thick D region one hour after the burst
it would be attenuated by 3657 dB. Even a 30 MHz signal would be attenuated by 482 dB
up to one hour after the burst. Using Figure 3.5 we see the Ne would have to be reduced
to about 5.5 x 103 before the 10.9 MHz signal would experience even a 20 dB reduction in
its signal to noise ratio. This value would not be attained until approximately 5 hours after
the burst and then only at night. It is obvious from the forgoing examples that an HF
satellite communications link would not be reliable in a nuclear environment.
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IV. SATELLITE PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Since there has never been an operational passive communications satellite system,
many of the performance characteristics that will be discussed in this chapter are theoretical
rather than empirical. The only empirical information concerning passive satellites was
derived from the early ECHO satellites. These satellites were designed solely for
experimental purposes and were not intended to be a communications prototype.
The Passive Communication Satellite (PACSAT) is the most recent attempt to examine
the feasibility of using a constellation of passive satellites for strategic communications
purposes. The concept of a passive communications array was first introduced by Joseph
Yater in the early 1970's. He envisioned an extremely long (4 x 104 ft) array of dipoles
strung along a vertical filament and maintained in orbit via radiation pressure at radio
frequencies that would be generated from ground facilities. [Ref. 15]
Yater's original proposal was thoroughly examined by the Rand Corporation under
DARPA contract . This chapter will describe PACSAT's operating characteristics in light
of an example of a two way aircraft-to-aircraft link. It will also delineate the system's
deficiencies with respect to orbital and structural characteristics.
A. PACSAT OPERATION
The Passive Communication Satellite is envisioned as being totally passive without the
capability of amplifying or processing the received signal. In order to maintain its passive
qualities orbital stability will be attained by using the earth's gravity gradients. This will
eliminate the need for the transmission of any corrective Tracking, Telemetry and Control
(TTC) signal from either the earth or the satellite. This differs from Yater's original
proposal which suggested that the array's orbital position be corrected by the use of
radiation pressure from radio frequencies generated by earth tracking stations.
PACSAT will operate predominantly within the SHF frequency band with a nominal
carrier frequency of 8 to 10 Ghz. Not only is the satellite operable over a broad range of
frequencies but its area of coverage is also frequency steerable. [Ref. 10: p. 13]
B. PACSAT STRUCTURE
The array consists of a long string of spherical scattering elements. Both the size and
number of these elements are chosen so as to enhance the backscattering characteristics and
therefore the directivity and gain of the entire array. A schematic of one section of the array









Figure 4.1 Section of PACSAT Array
The array may be composed of as few as 100 and as many as 1,000 sections each of
which will contain 99 spheres for a total length of 1.54 meters. The spheres are
constructed of nickle plated brass and have a diameter of approximately 1 centimeter with a
spacing of about 6/10 of a centimeter. The spacing (s) of the spheres is dependent upon the





By restricting the sphere spacing to between X/2 and X the signal returned to the earth
is limited to the first grating lobe. Additionally, the backscatter radiation returned towards
the earthbound receiver is maximized if the satellite operates within the vicinity of the first




and a = sphere radius. [Ref. 9: p. 12]
C . ORBITAL PLACEMENT
The selection of the orbital altitude is dependent upon a myriad of variables, primary
among these is the intended area of coverage and the required field of view for the satellite.
The area of coverage is in turn dependent upon the satellite's primary mission which, in
this case, is to establish emergency communications with U.S. strategic forces based
within the continental United States. The satellite must be placed in a circular orbit if it is to
take advantage of gravity gradient stabilization. Because of near-field phase errors the
selected orbit must not be less than one earth radius in altitude. [Ref. 9]
36
For illustrative purposes the satellite array will be injected into a circular polar orbit at
an altitude of 10,000 Km. The actual altitude will depend upon the desired satellite
footprint as well as the acceptable amount of signal loss due to propagation. As can be
seen in Figure 4.2, at an altitude of 10,000 Km the satellite's field of view will be 0.4995
steradians with a worst case one way propagation distance of about 15,423 Km. In order
to provide coverage of all areas above 309N latitude a minimum of 26 satellites would have
to be placed into orbit. This would enable the earth station to see the satellite through 149
of its orbit. [Ref. 10: p. 141
Figure 4.2 PACSAT Field of View
D. RETURN SIGNAL
The signal which is returned by the satellite is centered upon the satellite's subpoint
and is shaped like a hollow cone or annulus. This link configuration is shown in Figure
2.3. The angle of the returned signal (pi) is dependent upon the wavelength of the
transmitted frequency, and the transmission angle (a) according to the following function
[Ref. 7: p. 13]:
s(cos a + cos Si) = X (eqn 4.3)
As can be seen from equation 4.3 one is able to steer the antennas footprint by selecting the
appropriate operating frequency.
The solid angle occupied by the satellite's radiation pattern is determined by:
ftann = 2JC sin B(dB) (eqn 4.4)
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where (3 is the angle of the returned signal and dp is the 1/2 power beamwidth of the
satellite's re-radiation. When the angle of transmission (a) is equal to (3 at 23- and fc = 8
Ghz then the size of the annulus may be approximated by:
2tc(0.886)X,
= 1J9 x 1Q^ steradians (eqn 4 5)
where L equals the array length of 1.5 Km. [Ref. 10: p. 17]
To determine the physical size of the annulus we must convert the result obtained in




Substituting 1.39 x 10"4 steradians for Qann we get 6.652 x 10* 3 radians or 0.389 .
Assuming a satellite altitude of 10,000 Km the actual size of the annulus is then found to be
approximately 100 Km.
The gain that may be realized within this annulus is a function of the radar cross
section of the satellite and is proportional to the square of the array's length. This radar
cross section may be approximated by:
a - 0.6L2 (eqn 4.7)
This in turn is approximately equal to a 61 dB enhancement for a typical array length of
1,500 meters. [Ref. 9: p. 76]
All of the returned energy is concentrated within this 100 Km annulus. While this
allows for a great deal of signal directivity it also places the added burden upon the receiver
to search for and lock onto the correct carrier frequency.
E. EARTH TRANSMITTER/RECEIVER
The receiver and transmitter specifications which are set forth in Table 4 are those
which are proposed by Frankel as being demonstrative of a normal operational link
configuration between two aircraft. These same parameters are used in the following
sections to determine the path calculations and the carrier to noise ratio which may be





Power 20 Kw 1 Kw
Antenna Size D = 1.5 mtr [3x3mtr] 1/V2
Antenna Area (Ae) 1.767 6.36
Antenna Efficiency (r|) 0.55 0.55
Antenna Gain 39.4 dB 6.5 dB
Receiver Syst. Temp 1829K
The receiver system temperature is based upon a receiver temperature of 75Q K and a





290 + 75 = 1829K (eqn 4.8)
1 . Path Calculations
The path calculations for the satellite are presented in Figure 4.3. The total






where R = 15,000 Km distance from the transmitter or receiver to the passive array. As
can be seen in Figure 4.3 the total received signal strength (Pr) is equal to -164 dB.
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Pr = 43 - 2 + 39.4 - 1 - 348.5 + 61 + 46.5 - 1- 2= -164 dB
Figure 4.3 PACSAT Path Calculations
2 . Message Characteristics
While a Pr = -164 dB may appear to be excessively small the reception may be
improved by using Viterbi encoding with a K = 5 and a rate of R = 2/3. The primary
performance criteria for the received digital signal is the bit error rate (Pe). Assuming a
minimum acceptable error rate of one in a thousand (Pe = 10" 3 ) then with the Viterbi
encoding there must be a minimum signal to noise ratio of 4 dB in order to provide the
required error rate. This signal to noise ratio may be attained by reducing the speed of
transmission (R-Bps)- Equation 4.10 shows that the signal to noise ratio (EtAlo) is inversely







where k = Boltzmann's constant (1.38 x lO23 joule s/kelvin), Ts is the system temperature,
and Tb is the time to transmit one bit of data (Tb = 1/RRps)- Solving for RBps while at the
same time converting to logarithmic form provides us with:





After substituting the appropriate values into equation 4. 1 1 the maximum data rate that can
support a signal to noise ration of 4 dB is 3162 Bps. (Ref. 10: p. 16]
With respect to the transmitted message, each EAM (Emergency Action
Message) is assumed to be 400 bits long and will be transmitted in equally sized packets of
200 bits each. In order to ensure that each message packet is received by all stations within
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the satellites field of view each packet must be transmitted a total of 3600 times. The
reason for this is that while the PACSAT Qfv = 0.5 steradians the field of view of the







The time to transmit the entire message is:
200 bits
3600 repeats x 2 x 3162Bps
= 7.8 min (eqn4.13)
3 . Frequency Hopping
The system will use a quasi random frequency hopping technique using 3600
frequencies over a total bandwidth of 360 MHz. The bandwidth of each of the selected
frequencies will be 100 MHz. The 100 MHz bandwidth is limited by the physical size of
PACSAT array. The changes in frequency will steer the returned signal in 3 dB bandwidth
hops so as to cover the entire field of view of the satellite. The time that will be required to
transmit the 3600 frequencies is 3.9 minutes.
4 . Jamming Resistance
The jam resistance that is inherent in this technique results in a processing gain or
jammer penalty of 360 MHz/3 Khz = 51 dB. Additionally the dwell time per frequency is
only 200 bits/3162 Bps = 0.063 seconds.
F. PACSAT DEFICIENCIES
While the foregoing discussion has provided a fairly comprehensive view of
PACSATs operating parameters under ideal operating conditions it has not dealt with some
of the system's deficiencies. Some of the problems that will be discussed are the near-field
effect, carrier frequency search and acquisition, limited coverage area, and orbital stability.
1. Near-Field Effect
When the PACSAT array is placed in an orbit that is less than one earth radius
(6,371 Km) altitude the returned signal will suffer from phase errors due to the large
number of reflectors used in the array. The amount of phase distortion is proportional to
the number of elements in the array and is inversely proportional to the orbital altitude.
When an array of 1,500 meters is placed in a low earth orbit the receiver will no longer be
in the far-field of the reflected wave and may experience a loss of up to 3.4 dB due to the
phase error of the near-field effect. This loss may be further aggravated if the array is not
aligned vertically with the earth. [Ref. 16: p. 28]
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The near-field affect may be ameliorated by using pseudo-noise modulation on
the carrier. The array is in effect spatially subdivided into subarrays each containing 4,000
elements. This is accomplished by using a pseudo-noise code with a period that spans the
4,000 elements. Each correlation of the returned signal "...produces a weighted sum of the
dephased returns...." [Ref. 16: p. 32], In this way the loss suffered from the near-field
effect may be reduced to less than 0.2 dB.
2 . Carrier Frequency
As we saw from the previous discussion the returned signal has a very narrow
beamwidth which is aimed by selecting the appropriate frequency in accordance with
equation 4.3. The problem that arises is that while the transmitter may know the exact
angle of transmission (a) and angle of reception ((3) from an a priori list, the transmission
angle remains unknown to the receiver. The receiver is therefore required to search for the
appropriate carrier frequency. This may be corrected if the carrier frequency is varied in
discrete intervals over a predefined range. [Ref. 16: pp. 1 1-16]
Since the receiver knows the reception angle ((3) either through a priori
knowledge or through direct measurement it may determine a range of corresponding
transmission angles (a). It then cycles through the range of frequencies dictated by a. The
spacing between frequencies is selected so as to steer the reflected beam in 3 dB beamwidth
increments. This is the beamwidth which corresponds to a 3 dB reduction from the peak
returned signal. [Ref. 16: p. 16]
One of the drawbacks of this process is that the number of frequencies that must
be scanned is proportional to the number of elements in the array as well as the sum of the
cosines of the transmission and reception angles. In an array of about 80,000 elements this
translates into a total of 1,355 different frequencies each separated by 101.3 KHz. A
formidable task for any receiver. However, by increasing the frequency detection time the
number of detector channels can be reduced from 1,355 to 49. [Ref. 16: p. 22]
While this system may work well for transmitting information to stationary
strategic forces it would severely restrict the mobility of naval forces. Depending upon the
operating environment it may not always be feasible for the transmitting station to know the
intended receiving units actual position to the degree of accuracy required by this frequency
steering technique.
3 . Coverage Area
A basic limitation of this system is that the area of coverage is limited by the
amount of signal loss that can be sustained. There is a basic trade-off between the satellites
field of view and the signal to noise ratio. As the satellite's altitude increases the field of
view increases but the signal to noise ratio decreases due to increased spreading losses.
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Equation 4.9 shows that the loss due to spreading increases as the fourth power of the
distance from transmitter/receiver to the satellite. The spreading loss incurred as a function
of orbital altitude for an 8 GHz signal is shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4 Spreading Loss vs Orbital Altitude
In Figure 4.4 the spreading loss in dB was computed for the longest
transmission path that would exist for the orbital altitude indicated. The length of this
transmission path is computed from the transmitter to the midpoint of the antenna array
using equation 4. 14:
L2 = Re2 + (Re + h)2 - 2Re(Re + h)cos0 (eqn 4.14)
where Re = one earth radius (6371 Km), h = array's orbit altitude, and 8 is the polar angle
formed by the transmitter and the array [Ref. 9: p. 39]. The polar angle used in computing
Figure 4.4 is the maximum angle at which the observer is able to see the array. This occurs
when the observer is located on the horizon.
As the satellite's orbit is reduced to the lower limit of one earth radius the number
of satellites required to provide continuous coverage increases while their field of view
decreases. The minimum number of satellites in a constellation is a function of the type of




One of the most stringent constraints placed upon PACSAT is the need for the
array to remain erect within it's orbit. If the loss in the radar cross section is not to exceed
1 dB then the amount of libration (tilt away from vertical) must be less than 1.5- and the
flexure (curvature of the array) must be limited to a fraction of the operating wavelength.
At a carrier frequency of 8 GHz the array must not flex more than 5 mm. The array flexural
requirements are depicted in Table 5. [Ref. 17: p. 2]
TABLE 5
PACSAT FLEXURAL REQUIREMENTS
Reduction in Departure from Maximum Parabolic




Some of the forces that will affect the array's libration and flexure while in orbit
are:
• earth's gravitational field
• elastic forces of tension and bending
• perturbations in the initial launch condition
• ellipticity of orbit
• earth oblateness effects
• solar and lunar gravity
• solar radiation pressure
• micrometeoroid impacts
• thermal bending
Of these forces, those which have the greatest effect upon the departure from
vertical are earth oblateness, ellipticity of orbit and the initial launch condition. Even
though dampening devices are attached to both ends of the array, major perturbations in the
initial launch condition will have a lasting affect upon the satellite. The initial condition as
well as the amount of thermal bending and micrometeoroid impact significantly affect the
flexure of the array. Solar and lunar gravity as well as solar radiation pressure have the
least affect upon the array's condition. [Ref. 17: p. 31
Thermal bending is the result of differential expansion caused by solar heating.
This expansion causes the array to bend away from the sun. In order for the thermal
bending to be reduced to within acceptable limits the absorptivity of the array material must
be below 0.0007. As was stated by Sollfrey in his investigation of the flexure
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characteristics of the array, "Thermal bending effects will excite resonant oscillations of
large amplitude and are so severe that it is highly unlikely that they can be overcome." [Ref.
17: p. 110]
5 . Transmission Rate
As was shown earlier the transmission rate (Bps) is varied so as to attain the
required signal to noise ratio. The problem with this approach is that since the received
power is so low any further reduction will have a significant affect upon the transmission
rate. For example, the link parameters given in Figure 4.3 result in a received power (Pr)
of -164 dB. If this power drops by one dB the transmission rate would have to be slowed
from 3162 Bps to 2512 Bps and thereby increasing the transmission time for a 400 bit
message from 7.8 to 9.5 minutes.
Within a non-stressed environment signals within the SHF band may be
attenuated by rainfall. The amount of attenuation is proportional to the carrier frequency
and the rainfall rate. In a heavy rainfall of about 15 mm/hr a 8 GHz signal will be
attenuated in excess of 0.1 dB/Km [Ref. 3: p. 78].
The situation is analogous to a HF link where the capacity of the link will vary
over time as a function of the signal to noise ratio. This relationship is show in equation
4.15 where: C = channel capacity, B = bandwidth in Hz, s(f) and n(f) are the signal and
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Figure 4.5 shows the reduced transmission rate that results from the signal
transiting a 10 Km area with the rainfall rate as indicated. All parameters have remained the
same as depicted in Figure 4.3 with the addition of added attenuation due to rainfall. The
times shown are the total time required to transmit a 400 bit message.
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Figure 4.5 Transmission Rate vs Attenuation Loss
In an environment stressed by a nuclear detonation the attenuation affects may be
even more pronounced. While absorption is not a significant factor for frequencies within
the SHF band, attenuation due to suspended particulate matter becomes a significant
concern. The amount of attenuation will depend upon the weapon yield, height of burst,
time after burst, and the propagation path. Additionally, nuclear induced scintillation will
cause an increase in the signal attenuation.
As can be seen from the above, the variations in the quality of the transmission
path will require an inordinate degree of coordination between the transmitter and the




This chapter will attempt to analyze the effectiveness of passive communications
satellites in light of the previous discussions dealing with nuclear survivability and satellite
design characteristics. It will examine the advantages and disadvantages of a passive
system with respect to the satellite's operating environment. We will also examine the
problems inherent to using the HF spectrum in conjunction with a passive satellite
communications system.
In addition to evaluating the operational aspects of the communications system, this
chapter will start with an examination of some of the factors affecting the cost of both active
and passive satellite networks.
A. COST COMPARISON
This section will not attempt to provide a definitive analysis of all the operating and
development costs of an active or passive satellite rather, it will identify some of the factors
influencing the total cost equation. It will also distinguish between total system cost and
cost efficiency over time.
1 . Launch Cost as a Function of Weight
Some factors affecting the satellite's launch cost are the orbital altitude, payload
weight, and satellite size. The anticipated weight of a 1500 meter PACSAT array with an
operating frequency of 8 GHz is only 200 Kg [Frankel p.9]. The DSCS-II satellite on the
other hand has a beginning of life (BOL) weight of 500 Kg. The intended launch vehicle
for PACSAT is the Titan-III C, the same launch vehicle which was used for DSCS-II. In
1970 the launch cost for a Titan-III booster depended upon it's payload. Prices started at
$8.4 million for 455 Kg and went up to $18.1 million for 1364 Kg [Ref. 19].
Using existing chemical rocket technology, it currently costs between $4,000 to
$10,000 per kilogram to ferry payload mass into low earth orbit via the space shuttle [Ref.
20]. This translates into a shuttle launch cost for PACSAT of $800,000 to $2 million.
The loss of the Challenger space shuttle in August 1986 left a void in the United
States' satellite launch capability. This void is rapidly being filled by other nations,
primarily by the European's Ariane booster and the Soviet Union's Soyuz and Proton
rockets. At the 1986 International Aeronautical Federation (IAF) meeting in Budapest,
representatives from the Soviet "civilian" space agency Glavkosmos, announced that they
would provide launch services to other nations via the SL-4 Soyuz and the SL-12 Proton
rockets. The cost for placing a 300 Kg payload into low earth orbit aboard the SL-4 would
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be 8 million Swiss francs ($5.4 million U.S. dollars). The Proton rocket could be used at
a cost of 40 million Swiss francs ($27 million U.S. dollars) with a 100,000 deposit. The
SL-4 is capable of lifting 2,000 Kg into geosynchronous orbit or 20,000 Kg into a low
earth orbit. Intelsat has already scheduled the launch of the Intelsat 6, a 2000 Kg
communications satellite for the Proton in 1989. The Europeans on the other hand are
charging $80 million per launch for the Ariane booster. [Ref. 21].
The launch costs as a factor of weight for a PACSAT system would only be
about 1/5 of those for a Fleetsatcom satellite which weighs in at approximately 1000 Kg.
The negative side of this argument is that after taking into consideration the total of 26
satellites required for the PACSAT constellation, the aggregate weight for the passive
system is about equal to that of the 5 satellites required for Fleetsatcom (see Table 2).
With regard to orbital altitude the passive satellite system has a distinct advantage
over the active systems. Placing a constellation of 26 satellites into low earth orbit would
allow for one launch vehicle to deploy multiple satellites. This would in effect reduce the
launch cost per satellite.
An additional concern is the availability of launch vehicles for a passive satellite
system. Since such a system would not contain sensitive components such as on-board
processing equipment, there would be little reason to prevent the system from being
launched by other nations. Therefore, even if payload space aboard the space shuttle is
preempted by higher priority shipments, the passive satellites may still be deployed by
other U.S. launch vehicles (Titan-IH) or even by other nations.
2 . Satellite Design Factors
Pritchard has indicated that the determinants of satellite cost are dependent upon
the desired carrier to noise density ratio (C/No) and the coverage area (A^ov). The exact
relation is indicated in equation 5.1. The left side of this equation describes the desired
information capacity for a specified area, while the right side is composed of the system
parameters that are the primary determinants of cost. D is the diameter of the earth station
antenna, Ts is the overall receiver system temperature, Pt is the transmit power, and K is a
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For an active satellite system there exists a trade-off between the satellite's
transmission power and the size and capability of the ground stations. If there are many
users that access the satellite system, the overall network costs may be reduced by
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increasing the relay capability of the satellites rather than boosting the size and power of all
the earth stations. Therefore, based upon the total size of the network there exists some
optimum value for satellite capacity with respect to cost
.
In the case of a passive satellite system with a specified coverage area and a
minimum signal to noise density ratio, the limiting factor will be the size and power of the
ground stations. Since there is no on-board processing or amplification of the received
signal the carrier to noise density ratio will be determined by the transmitting site. This in
effect will require that all transmitting sites be larger in both power and size than would
normally be the case for an active satellite.
Rather than being able to increase the capacity of a limited number of
components, i.e., the satellites themselves, the power, size, and system temperature of
each of the ground stations would have to be enhanced. Ameliorating this is the fact that it
is far easier to improve the capabilities of the ground facilities than those of the satellites.
Due to size constraints the mobility of the transmitters would be greatly reduced.
It is very unlikely that these transmitters can attain the degree of portability that is evident in
the current inventory of communication satellite transmitters.
3 . Active Satellite Cost Efficiency Model
While the total development costs for communications satellites has increased,
the cost per circuit-year has gone down with time. In 1984 Namkoong performed a
statistical analysis on 13 series of commercial communication satellites to determine the
primary factors that influence cost efficiency over time. The data was pertinent only for
mature technologies and for existing active satellite systems. He did not include in his
sample the first of a new series of satellites due to the high development costs involved
with a prototype system. Once again, the emphasis was on mature existing technologies
and as such may not be totally applicable for a passive communications system. [Ref. 22]
The primary variables taken into consideration were the satellite's beginning of
life (BOL) weight and bandwidth-years. This is defined as the amount of bandwidth used
by the satellite over it's expected design life. Both of these variables are considered to be a
measure of the satellite's capacity. The former is a physical measure while the latter is a
functional measure of capacity. [Ref. 22]
The general telecommunications cost model which was developed by L. W. Ellis
and later modified by Namkoong is depicted in equation 5.2:
C = KeC-NKt-^xaycDd (eqn 5.2)
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where C = cost, \\f is the annual exponential rate of technological change, X = capacity, D=
distance, and V relates to the efficiencies gained by changing the slope of the learning curve
through increased production runs. The exponents a, c, and d are indicative of the
economies of scale while K is an unspecified constant. Finally t-tn represents the time in
years from the first procurement.
Since distance only determines the initial costs associated with satellite placement
and does not effect the continuing costs of the network, it was removed from the equation.
"V" was also considered to be an insignificant determinant of cost and, therefore,
it too was dropped from the equation. The rational being that production runs are very
limited in size and, therefore, do not significantly change production efficiency. Also as
the satellite series matures new technology with different production runs may be used in
subsequent satellites thereby further reducing the effects of production efficiency upon
cost. [Ref. 22]
In an attempt to determine the cost per unit of capacity (UC) both sides of
equation 5.2 were divided by X resulting in:
UC = Ke(-VAt)X-« (eqn 5.3)
where At = t-to and -n = a-1. In this form either satellite weight or bandwidth-years could
be substituted for X as a measure of satellite capacity. [Ref. 22: p. 2]
a. Cost Efficiency and BOL Weight
A least squares analysis with 10 degrees of freedom was conducted on the
collected data. The coefficient of determination (R 2 ) was found for each formulation of the
efficiency function. In the case of satellite mass the R2 value was only equal to 0.101, with
a t-statistic of -0.78 for X (BOL weight) and -0.46 for At. It was therefore concluded that
mass is an insignificant determinant of decreasing satellite cost. [Ref. 22: p. 5]
b. Cost Efficiency and Bandwidth-Year
When the log form of equation 5.3 was used to analyze bandwidth-years as
a determinant of unit cost it was found to be statistically significant. The coefficient of
determination for this case was equal to 0.732 (0.678 after being adjusted for the
appropriate degrees of freedom). There was a t-statistic of -2.51 for At and -0.98 for X
(Bandwidth-years). Therefore there is a stronger correlation for economies of scale for
technological changes in bandwidth- years than there is for satellite weight. [Ref. 22: p.5]
While these results relate specifically to active communications satellites,
one may assume that satellite capacity as measured in terms of bandwidth-years will also
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have a significant affect upon the economies of scale and marginal cost's of passive
satellites.
4 . Passive Satellite Costs
Since passive communications satellites have never been used operationally there
is no empirical data relating to the systems development and operating costs. This section
however will attempt to identify some of the factors that must be considered in the
development of such a system.
a. Goodyear Cost Model
In the late 1960's NASA commissioned the Goodyear Aerospace
Corporation and the Stanford Research Institute to study the feasibility of using a saddle
reflector as a passive communications satellite. During the course of this study they
developed a cost model for the total system cost per year. This model is shown in equation
5.4. [Ref. 19: p. 23]





Qdg = Cost of initial R & D for ground subsystem
Ceg = Cost of establishing the ground subsystem
Qds = Cost of the initial R & D for the orbiting subsystem
Ne = Number of launches needed to establish the space segment
Cis = Total cost of the booster and launch services
Ke,m = Number of satellites per booster
Cs = Cost of individual satellite
i = Annual rate of return on invested capital (i.e., the interest rate)
n = Number of years to recover the capital expenditures (satellite operating life)
Qng = Annual operating and maintenance costs for the ground segment
Nm = Number of launches required per year to replenish the satellites
As may be seen from the above, the actual cost of the satellite itself is just a
small portion of the total costs that are incurred by this communications system. In the case
of the saddle reflectors the actual cost of the satellite is dependent upon the desired reflector
gain, satellite weight, and diameter. Figure 5.1 graphically depicts the trade-off between
these values . As the satellite gain or radar cross section goes up the antenna diameter must
be increased with a corresponding increase in the satellite's unit and development costs.





































Figure 5.1 Saddle Reflector Costs
The same situation is true for the PACSAT array. Equation 4.7 shows that
the radar cross section of the array is proportional to the square of the array's length. One
would expect that the size of the satellite would have a direct effect upon the system's
development, production, and launch costs. The larger the array the fewer the satellites that
can be simultaneously launched from one launch vehicle, therefore, increasing the number
of boosters required to deploy the initial constellation. Assuming that the type of launch
vehicle remains the same, an increase in the satellite's radar cross section would cause a
corresponding increase in the following values: Cr(js, Ne , K^m, and Cs .
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b. PACSAT Cost Considerations
Equation 5.1 showed that as the intended area of coverage is increased for
an active satellite system there must necessarily be a corresponding increase in the size of
the earth stations. This is particularly true for a passive satellite system where the ground
station determines the probability of error of the received signal.
For PACSAT to cover an area the size of the continental United States a
minimum of 26 satellites would be required. The same area can be covered with more
satellites in a lower orbit with smaller ground stations. Since signal power is attenuated at
the fourth power of the distance traveled there would be significantly less loss at the lower
orbital altitudes. Depending upon the number of ground stations and the magnitude of their
development, establishment, and maintenance costs (Crcig, Ceg , Cmg), it may be less costly
to deploy more satellites than to bear the costs of the larger ground stations.
c. Echo Satellite Cost Factors
As we have already seen weight, size, and bandwidth or channel capacity
play a key role in determining the cost of both active and passive satellites. While the Echo
II was only designed for research purposes it was used for up to a year for communications
experiments. Table 6 provides a clear indication of why this type of satellite was not
feasible for operational purposes. It provides a listing of the weight and size required for
an Echo II type satellite to intercept one watt of power at the indicated altitude. Table 6 also
shows the channel capacity available if that one watt is radiated isotropically. [Ref. 23: p.
18]
TABLE 6










1000 932 39,400 500
2000 1227 76,950 222
3000 1506 132,000 135
5000 1778 194,000 68
10000 3094 872,000 22
It should be fairly obvious from the above why the decision was made to
pursue other technologies (i.e., saddle reflectors and scattering arrays) for the construction
of passive communication satellites.
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B . PASSIVE HF SATELLITES
There have been recent proposals suggesting the use of the HF band for passive
satellite communications [Ref. 24]. This proposal will be evaluated in light of the
information presented in chapters three and four.
1 . Satellite Size Requirements
In order to enhance the radar cross section of any dipole antenna the antenna
length must be some fraction of the selected wavelength. This poses a particular problem
for the HF spectrum where the wavelength is 150 to 10 meters.
In the case of Yater's array of passive dipole reflectors the spacing between the
scattering elements is determined by equation 4.1. If the array's optimal design frequency
(fl) is selected so as to fall within the upper limit of the HF band i.e., fi = 30 MHz, then
the spacing between elements will be approximately 5 meters.
The size of the scattering elements themselves may be determined by using
equation 4.2. In order to return the maximum backscatter radiation toward the earth, the
product Koa must be approximately equal to 1 .0. With a design frequency of 30 MHz each
of the scattering elements would then be about 1.6 meters in diameter. Based upon a 30
MHz design frequency and the above proportions, each 99 sphere section of the array
would be about 653.4 meters long. This does not compare favorably with the dimensions
shown in Figure 4.1 for SHF operation.
Equation 4.7 shows that the radar cross section (RCS) of the passive array is
proportional to the square of its length. While an array of the same length for both SHF
and HF design frequencies would yield the same RCS, the HF array would be so bulky,
because of the size of the scattering spheres, that it could not be easily deployable.
2 . SNR of an HF Dipole Satellite
In a benign environment the signal to noise ratio will be primarily affected by the
amount of spreading loss due to propagation. Equation 4.9 shows that the loss is inversely
proportional to the square of the wavelength. In this respect HF communications have an
advantage because the longer wavelengths are less effected by propagation loss.
Using the same design configuration shown in Figure 4.3 but with an operating
frequency of 30 MHz the total spreading loss is 320 dB. This is approximately 28 dB less
than the loss incurred by the 8 GHz configuration. While this may seem substantial at first
it is not sufficient to provide a minimum SNR of 4 dB while maintaining a high data rate.
The reason for this is that the gain that may be attained from an HF transmit/receive antenna
is not as great as that from a SHF antenna.
For example, a log periodic HF antenna, which is considered to have a high gain
over a large range of frequencies, has a gain of only about 15 dBi. Substituting this value
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for both g t and gr in the calculations shown in Figure 4.3, and using a spreading loss of
320 dB we get a Pr of -192 dB. The calculations are shown in equations 5.5 and 5.6.
Pr = Pt -Lt + g t -Lpt -LSp + a + gr -Lpt -Lr in dB (eqn 5.5)
Where:
Pr = Received power in dB
P
t
= Transmitted power in dB
Lt = Line losses at the transmitter
g t = Transmit antenna gain in dB
Lp
t
= Loss due to pointing errors
Lgp = Propagation loss due to spreading in dB
a = Radar Cross section
gr = Receive antenna gain
Lr = Line losses at the receiver
Pr = 43 - 2 + 15 - 1 - 320 + 61 + 15 - 1 - 2 = -192 dB (eqn 5.6)
Equation 5.6 allowed for a radar cross section of 61 dB solely for the purpose of
comparing this result with the calculations in Figure 4.3. Given the required dimensions
calculated above it is very unlikely that this RCS would be attained.
The value attained in equation 5.6 was used to determine the maximum
transmission rate as defined by equation 4. 1 1. The result was a transmission rate of about
1082 Bps. While this rate provides the minimum SNR of 4 dB, it also increases the time it
takes to transmit a 400 bit message to all receiving units within the coverage area to 22.2
minutes (see equation 4.13).
One component that was left out of equation 5.5 is the amount of loss due to
atmospheric absorption (La). This value becomes especially significant when transmitting
in the HF band in an environment disturbed by a nuclear detonation. As we saw in chapter
three the amount of absorption is inversely proportional to the frequency of transmission.
Figure 3.5 shows that even one hour after a nuclear burst the electron density is
still in excess of 106 electrons/cm^. Using this value in conjunction with equation 3.9 we
see that the absorption loss for a carrier frequency of 30 MHz is equal to 44 dB/mile. This
would effectively preclude the use of the HF band for any form of passive satellite
communication in such an environment
3 . Unreliable Propagation Paths
The use of the HF spectrum for satellite communications would also introduce
the problem of erratic and unreliable propagation paths. As we saw in chapter three HF
transmissions bend away from highly ionized layers. Increased ionization of the various
layers within the atmosphere occurs regularly due to solar storms and increased sun spot
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activity. This can result in the bending of the signal as it passes through the sporadic E
layer or when it encounter the F layer. The resulting shadow zones may eliminate some
transmitter or receiver sites from the communications link.
4 . Multipath Interference
Unlike the deficiencies noted above, there is little likelihood that multipath
interference would pose a serious problem for HF satellite communications. In a benign
environment under normal operating conditions HF skywave communications operates at
or near the Maximum Usable Frequency (MUF). Operating at this frequency assures the
greatest range for skywaves while at the same time reducing the likelihood that a distant
receiver site will receive both the ground wave and the skywave component of the signal.
Basically, the ranges for direct path line of sight propagation are inversely proportional to
the transmitting frequency.
If the HF band were to be used for satellite communication the transmitter would
have to operate above the MUF in order for the signal to propagate through the F layer and
on out into space. This, therefore, would further limit any multipath interference at the
receiver.
5 . Frequency Availability
Under normal HF propagation the transmission frequency is chosen so as to lie
between the Lowest Usable Frequency (LUF) and the MUF. During high sunspot activity
or a particularly strong solar flare the LUF may spike above the MUF. In these cases there
is a total blackout of the HF frequency band. The same results would occur even if the
mode of transmission was via satellite. Therefore there would be times when a portion if
not all of the HF band is unusable.
Additionally, since satellite transmissions would always require the use of
frequencies above the MUF the lower range of the HF band would be unavailable. In a
hostile environment this makes the job of a potential jammer that much easier. He no
longer has to search the entire frequency band but only those frequencies above the MUF.
C. PASSIVE SHF SATELLITES
The following is an analysis of some of the characteristics of a passive SHF satellite
system. Particular emphasis is placed upon the operating characteristics within a hostile
environment and the satellite's ability to maintain a communications link.
1 . Nuclear Environment
As can be seen in Figure 3.8 the increased ionization from a nuclear burst will
have little effect upon the absorption of an 8 GHz carrier frequency. The added loss due to
absorption at this frequency is less than 1 x 10-3 dB/mile. Absorption within the SHF band
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becomes significant only when the signal traverses the fireball cloud. Complete absorption
may occur due to the very high electron densities within the cloud. Additionally, the
increased thermal noise from within the fireball will cause a reduction in the quality of the
received signal. However, this is only significant if the transmit or receive antenna is
pointed direcdy at the fireball. The noise caused by synchrotron radiation is much weaker
and will have a greater effect upon signals at the lower frequencies. [Ref. 1 1: p. 480]
Of greater concern is the amount of particulate matter suspended in the
atmosphere after a nuclear burst. The more particulate matter the greater the degradation in
the received power (Pr). An analogy may be drawn with the rainfall rate and signal
degradation. Figure 4.5 shows that the communications transmission rate is inversely
proportional to the rate of rainfall. In order to maintain the required signal to noise ratio
the bit rate must be reduced so that the signal density (PrTb) remains the same.
2 . PACSAT Orbital Stability
In Yater's original proposal [Ref. 15] for a passive satellite array, one of the
arguments he used to gain support for his concept was that the array's signal power to
weight ratio was very low. He argues that a passive scattering array would have a greater
relayed signal power per weight than an active satellite. If one compares the ideal PACSAT
array with a radar cross section of 61 dB and a mass of only 200 Kg to the military
communications satellites described in Table 2, one can see that this statement is quite true.
However, the magnitude of the returned signal, i.e., RCS, is very much dependent upon
the orbital stability of the array.
The most serious problem faced by PACSAT and any other unsupported
scattering array is the amount of flexure and libration. As was pointed out by Sollfrey, the
array must remain within 1.5s of vertical and may not flex more than 5 mm if it is to
maintain the required RCS. Gravity gradient forces alone are not sufficient to prevent the
excessive flexure of the unsupported PACSAT array. [Ref. 17]
A means of preventing the flexure of the unsupported array is by increasing the
tension on the array. Since the amount of flexural displacement is inversely proportional to
the tension on the array it may be possible to stabilize it by attaching trusses made of
dielectric members. Another alternative is to use bow-like supports to hold the array
between their tips. [Ref. 7: p.26]
The early Echo satellites also encountered a similar problem with orbital
instability. Since the satellites exhibited a large surface area to mass ratio they were greatly
effected by atmospheric drag. At low orbital altitudes they encountered a relatively dense
atmosphere which caused the orbit to deteriorate. This problem was solved by the OVI-8
grid sphere satellite.
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PasComSat as it was called, was 30 feet in diameter and was fabricated by
joining a total of 162 pentagonal and hexagonal panels into a geodesic pattern. The total
weight of the sphere was only 23 pounds. Once the sphere was inflated in orbit ultraviolet
radiation from the sun caused photolyzation of the film like skin thereby leaving only the
metal grid frame. The satellite remained in orbit for 12 years even though it's orbital
altitude was only 500 miles. [Ref. 23: p. 20] Further study would have to be conducted to
determine if such a system could be effectively used to construct an entire constellation of
passive communications satellites.
3. PACSAT Alternatives
The majority of the research in recent years has been dedicated to the
development of active communications satellite systems. While PACSAT represents one of
the more recent attempts at developing a passive system it is not the only system that has
been studied. As we saw in earlier chapters the original Echo system was able to maintain
an effective two way communications link between two stations separated by more than
2,000 miles. Prior to the advent of the geosynchronous satellite, Project Rebound was
designed to encircle the earth with a ring of passive balloon satellites [Ref. 23: p. 16]
A passive communications satellite based upon orbiting saddle reflectors was
studied by the Goodyear Corporation in 1970. This system proposed using an orbital
reflector in conjunction with one or more master ground terminals. These terminals were to
be located between the primary transmitter and receiver in order to act as a relay station.
The satellite itself was a planar array that generated a fan beam that could be frequency
steered in one angle while being spin stabilized. The spin would cause the beam to scan
across the earth in the other angle. [Ref. 19]
The OVI-8 was successful in correcting one of the major flaws of the early Echo
satellites, orbital instability. Similar grid spheres were also used in 1971 to conduct
experiments investigating the near earth environment. They were also used to calibrate
earth radars. [Ref. 23: p. 21]
A modified version of PACSAT, similar to the one discussed above, may prove
to be a viable alternative. Table 7 provides a summary of some of the advantages and
disadvantages that are unique to a passive communications satellites using either the SHF




HF/SHF ADVANTAGES & DISADVANTAGES
HF
Large satellite reflectors
Low gain earth transmit/receive antennas
Slower transmission rate





Large radar cross section
Susceptible to scintillation in both nuclear and benign environments
Small scattering spheres
High gain earth transmit/receive antennas
D. SUITABILITY FOR MEECN
Through the course of this discussion we have seen that a passive communications
satellite would be ill suited for a tactical mission. In order to select the appropriate transmit
frequency the transmitter must have an a priori knowledge of the receiver's position. This
would not always be possible in a tactical environment. Also the size of the transmitter
sites and the constraints placed upon the receivers mobility would be excessively
restrictive.
However the avowed mission for the PACSAT system is strategic in nature, it is
intended to be part of the MEECN system. As part of this system the passive satellite
would act in a broadcast mode so as to transmit the emergency action message from one
central position to many receiver sites. In order to successfully accomplish this mission
any communications system must, to one degree or another, exhibit the following
characteristics: redundancy, graceful degradation, flexibility, survivability, reliability, and
interoperability. This section will attempt to evaluate how well the PACSAT system, and
passive satellites in general fulfill these requirements.
1 . Satellite Redundancy
The large number of satellites required to maintain a fully functional
communications constellation is both a boon and a bane. Many satellites allow for a certain
degree of redundancy as well as graceful degradation. The elimination of one or two
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satellites either through downlink jamming or through direct removal will not completely
disrupt the entire constellation. At worst it will cause temporary blank spots within the
coverage area. Additionally, since these satellites are in low earth orbit and are light in
comparison to most active satellites, replacements may be launched with relative ease.
The primary difficulty arises in the initial installation of the constellation. Once
the large number of satellites have been installed further launches would only be required
for replacement purposes or as a means of increasing the system's redundancy and
flexibility.
An additional problem caused by the low earth orbit is the need for the earth
stations to continuously track the satellites and switch to new satellites as they drop below
the horizon. However, depending upon the satellites altitude and the amount of longitude
that separates the transmitter and receiver sites, mutual viewing times in excess of 60
minutes can be readily attained. [Ref. 9: p. 64]
2. Flexibility
One of the mixed blessings of a passive satellite system is that the available
signal power is not restricted by the on-board satellite amplifiers. The negative aspect is
that the signal experiences an absorption loss proportional to the fourth power of the range
(R4 ). The absorption loss in an active system on the other hand is proportional to the
square of the range (R2). The positive side is that since the receive power is determined by
the transmitter site, adverse environmental conditions could be compensated for by
increasing the transmit power.
Due to the low orbital altitude of a passive satellite system the coverage area of
the constellation is far more restricted than that of a geosynchronous satellite. In the case of
the PACSAT system, if the constellation is placed in an equatorial orbit it would cover the
continental United States at the expense of the polar regions. This would severely restrict
the operating area of the strategic units and thereby limit their overall flexibility.
3 . Survivability
Low orbital altitudes also pose a problem for satellite survivability. With the
advent of more sophisticated anti- satellite weapons capable of reaching these low orbital
altitudes, passive satellites run an increased nsk of being neutralized by hostile forces.
Compensating this is the fact that there are so many satellites in orbit. The elimination of a
few satellites would not completely incapacitate the system.
Passive satellites would tend to be more resilient in a nuclear environment then
their active counterparts. While the atmospheric effects of a nuclear blast would have the
same debilitating effects upon both satellites, passive satellites would not be as susceptible
to HEMP damage.
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The sensitive electronic circuitry required for an on-board processing satellite is
subject to damage from high transient voltages caused by an electromagnetic pulse. Since
there are no on-board electronics in a passive satellite, there would be no damage due to the
HEMP effect. The only nuclear induced damage that could be sustained by a passive
satellite would be orbital displacement due to the shock wave or blast overpressure.
A passive satellite would also be more resistant to active jamming. Since there is
no travelling wave tube amplifier (TWTA) any attempt at uplink jamming would be
unsuccessful. In the case of downlink jamming frequency hopping over a very wide
frequency band would limit the effectiveness of this form of countermeasure.
The PACSAT system demonstrated that operating over a bandwidth of 360 Mhz
with a signal bandwidth of only 3 KHz imposed a 5 1 dB penalty on the potential jammer.
Additionally, the narrow beamwidth of the PACSAT system would make it very difficult
for the jammer to be within the same satellite footprint as the receiver. [Ref. 10: p. 20]
4. Reliability
Continued reliability is the major problem faced by a passive satellite system. In
the case of the PACSAT system orbital instabilities are such that continued reliability and
availability is questionable. For any passive system to be effective in a strategic role there
can be no doubt about the systems reliability.
An additional problem is that of signal attenuation due to rainfall or particulate
matter. In the previous chapter we saw that the probability of error for the received signal
was maintained by adjusting the rate of transmission. Should the attenuation increase there
would be a corresponding increase in the amount of time required to transmit the EAM.
Figure 4.5 graphically depicts the affects of attenuation upon transmission rates.
5 . Interoperability
A passive satellite system as described in the PACSAT proposal would have
limited interoperability between services. Due to the limited geographic coverage the
system would not be available to all of the strategic forces. The transmitter station would
have to know the position of the strategic unit in order to select the appropriate transmission
frequency. As we saw in the previous chapter the beamwidth of the returned signal is only
about 200 Km wide. This would make sustained two way communications with any one
specific unit of unknown position rather unwieldy.
This system would be best suited for a broadcast mode to units that have
restricted geographic positions. Strategic naval forces would not be able to avail
themselves of this system because of the mobility restrictions as well as the time required to
transmit any one message. In a benign environment it can take up to 8 minutes to transmit
a message. This time requirement may be greatly increased depending upon the degree of
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environmental degradation. Prolonged transmission times would increase the naval unit's
risk of detection by hostile forces.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The development and implementation of an operational passive satellite system can
prove to be a valuable asset to MEECN, provided that the selected design is able to
overcome the problem of orbital instability. Like the nuclear triad, the introduction of a
passive satellite system will add redundancy while complicating the enemy's decision
process.
The primary advantages with regard to a strategic role are its survivability in a hostile
environment and its graceful degradation. The major disadvantages of the system as
envisioned in the PACSAT design, is its questionable availability and reliability. An
additional problem for any passive satellite system is its limited coverage area per satellite.
While this adds to the redundancy of the system by requiring more satellites it also reduces
the system's interoperability.
Due to the restrictions placed upon a passive satellite system by propagation loss and
the limited field of view its overall role would necessarily be restricted in scope. While
sustained two-way communication would not be impossible it would certainly be
unwieldy. Therefore passive communications satellites would best be suited for a point-to-
multipoint mission in a restricted geographic area.
Both the power and satellite tracking requirements placed upon the transmitter sites
would increase their complexity as well as their costs as compared to those associated with
an active satellite system. The mobility of the receiver sites would be restricted by the need
of the transmitter to have an a priori knowledge of their positions in order to successfully
establish a communications link.
The overall cost effectiveness of a passive satellite system remains in doubt. While the
costs associated with the actual satellites themselves will most certainly be less than that of
an active satellite, the entire cost of the network depends to a great extent on the size and
number of both transmit and receive sites. The number of satellites and their selected
orbital altitude will greatly affect the costs of the ground stations. Unlike the active system
where the capabilities and costs of the ground stations may be balanced against the
capacities of a few satellites, a reduction in the costs of the ground stations in a passive
system may only be attained by increasing the number of satellites in orbit.
Any use of the HF band in conjunction with a passive satellite system would be
ineffective. The size requirements for an HF passive satellite would make its development
and deployment improbable. Additionally, such a system would be unreliable in a benign
environment and unsurvivable in a hostile one. Signal absorption due to high electron
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densities caused by a nuclear detonation would deny the use of the HF spectrum for
prolonged periods of time. Such an interdiction of a critical communications link at such a
crucial time would be unacceptable at best and fatal at worst.
A passive satellite system that uses the SHF band would not necessarily be totally
incapacitated in a nuclear environment. Such a system would suffer from the same
problems of signal attenuation and absorption that effect an active satellite system.
However, due to the low received power of a passive satellite signal they will be more
susceptible to the increased environmental noise caused by a nuclear burst. Unlike an
active communications system signal degradation in a passive system may be compensated
for by increasing the signal power at the transmitter site. Also, they are not susceptible to
HEMP damage as are active satellites.
The probability of downlink jamming of passive satellite communications may be
lessened by using frequency hopping techniques. The design specifications for the
PACSAT system showed that the downlink could be rendered relatively immune to
jamming by employing frequency hopping and focusing the signal within a narrow
beamwidth. Unlike an active satellite, a passive satellite is impervious to uplink jamming.
While passive satellites may be resistant to both jamming and HEMP damage, their
low orbital altitude reduces their chances of survival in a hostile environment. Even though
the survival of any one satellite remains in question, the survival of the entire network is
virtually assured against anything short of an all-out threat. The large number of satellites
increase the redundancy of the system and assures the graceful degradation of the network.
Before a definitive decision may be made, important questions concerning overall
system costs and orbital placement and stability must be answered, f orbital stability can
be assured through an alternate design approach, i.e., OVI-8 grid spnere, the addition of a






AFSATCOM Air Force Satellite Communications System
ASL Above Sea Level
BOL Beginning Of Life
Bps Bits per second
COMSAT Communications Satellites
DAMA Demand Assigned Multiple Access
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System
EAM Emergency Action Message
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
ERCS Emergency Rocket Communications System
FM Frequency Modulation
GHz Gigahertz
HEMP High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
HF High Frequency
HF-AJ High Frequency Anti Jam
KHz Kilohertz
LUF Lowest Usable Frequency
MEECN Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
MHz Megahertz
MUF Maximum Usable Frequency
NCA National Command Authority
NF Noise figure
PACSAT Passive Communications Satellite
RCS Radar Cross Section
SACDIN Strategic Air Command Digital Network
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SHF Super High Frequency
SIOP Single Integrated Operating Plan
SNR Signal to Noise Ratio
TTC Tracking, Telemetry & Control
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TWTA Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier
UC Unit Cost
UHF Ultra High Frequency









Carrier to noise density ratio








F(M) Effective mass absorption coefficient
f1 Fundamental design frequency for PACSAT array
G Gain in dB
Gr, gr Gain of the receive antenna
Gt, gt Gain of the transmit antenna
h PACSAT array's orbital altitude
K Constant
k Boltzmann's constant, 1.38xl0"23 joules/kelvin
Lpt Signal loss due to antenna pointing error
Lr Signal loss line losses at the receiver
Lsp Signal loss due to spreading
n Index of refraction
Ne Electron density
n(f) Noise power density function
Pr Total received signal power
Pt Transmitter power
R Distance from the transmitter/receiver to the satellite
RBps Transmission rate in bits per second
Re Earth's radius, approximately 6,37 1 Km
s Spacing between scattering elements in the PACSAT array
s(f) Signal power density function
Th Time to transmit one bit of data
Tr Receiver temperature
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Ts Total system temperature
V Electron collision frequency
W Nuclear weapon yield in kilotons
a Transmission angle from the earth transmitter to the PACSAT array
(3, Pi Angle of the returned PACSAT signal
8Ne Rate of change in electron density
8Z Rate of change in altitude
(p Transmission angle measured from the vertical
X Wavelength
6 Polar angle formed between the transmitter and the PACSAT array
p Air density in grams per centimeter cubed
a Radar cross section
Gm Minimum radar cross section
co Frequency in radians
Qann Field of view of the PACSAT array's annulus in steradians
Qfv Satellite's field of view in steradians
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